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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an empirical examination of the relationship between six 
finn characteristics, namely: firm size, industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, firm diversification, ownership diffusion, and voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in a regulated environment. This study 
provides empirical evidence that there are incentives for Australian companies 
with specific firm characteristics to voluntarily disclose segment info1mation in a 
regulated setting. 
The theoretical frameworks employed in this research study are agency 
theory and contracting theory. Compensation contracts are employed to resolve 
the potential conflicts of interest between the shareholders and managers giving 
rise to agency cost of equity. Debt contracts are employed to resolve the 
bondholders and shareholders/managers conflict giving rise to agency cost of 
debt. Management may voluntarily disclose additional segment information to 
reduce these agency costs. 
Compensation contracts and debt contracts align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders and debtholders. Managers are directly 
rewarded using a variety of compensation plans, such as stock option grants and 
stock appreciation rights. Managers have incentives to maximise firm value 
under these compensation plans as they may be rewarded with an increase in 
bonus payments and an increase in the value of their share options. 
In information costs (or proprietary costs), there are two forces influencing 
voluntary disclosure: (i) the cost of providing information and (ii) the 
corresponding associated benefits. Where there is a demand for private 
information by shareholders, debtholders and investors, its non-disclosure is 
likely to be interpreted as bad news and hence adversely affect firm value. 
Managers have incentives to voluntarily disclose additional segment information 
if there is a net benefit in disclosure. 
Certain industries may attract a disproportionate share of scrutiny from 
government agencies and special interest groups. These companies are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment information to reduce the 
likelihood of political costs. Political considerations include managers' concern 
about attracting explicit and implicit taxes, or regulatory actions. 
The six hypotheses in this thesis focus on a test of the contracting theory 
and agency theory. The firm size and firm diversification hypotheses are used as 
a test of the contracting theory, information costs. The industry membership 
hypothesis is employed to test the contracting thecry, political costs. The 
minority interest, financial leverage and ownership diffusion hypotheses are used 
as a test of the agency theory. 
This study is based on a sample of 185 companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange top 300 shares. Univariate and multivariate tests were perfonned 
on th:! six hypotheses in this thesis. The univariate test results provide evidence 
to support voluntary segment disclosure is significantly related to firm 
diversification, minority interest and financial leverage but no support was found 
for firm size, ownership diffusion and industry membership. The bivariate 
logistic regression test results found statistically significant support that voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in a regulated environment is related to firm 
diversification and firm size. No support was found for minority interest, 
financial leverage, ownership diffusion and industry membership. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
This thesis investigates and ascertains whether Australian companies 
provide voluntary disclosure of segment infonnation data over and above the 
requirements of the accounting standard AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by 
Segments1• The objective of this research study is to examine the firm 
characteristics associated with voluntarily segment disclosure and the 
economic incentives that motivate management's disclosure decisions. This 
study has been conducted in a regulated setting after the introduction of 
Australian Accounting Standard AAS 16 and Accounting Standard AASB 
1005 Financial Reporting by Segments effective on or after 31st March 1985 
and 30111. June 1986 respectively but before the implementation of the revised 
Accounting Standard AASB 1005 Segment Reporting effective on or after 1st 
July 2001. 
Prior research studies in voluntary disclosure of segment data by 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Kelly (1994), Mitchell, Chia and Loh 
(1995) and Aitken. Hooper and Pickering (1997) suggest that companies with 
particular firm characteristics have economic incentives for voluntary 
disclosure of segment data. These prior research studies were conducted in an 
unregulated setting. 
TL .. ~ examination of economic incentives motivating voluntary 
disclosure of additional segment information is based on the hypotheses that 
I 
this disclosure is expected to be greater for firms with particular firm 
characteristics such as firm size, industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, finn diversification, and ownership diffusion. These finns, 
it is argued, have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment information over 
and above that required by AASB 1005 because of benefits such as reduced 
agency costs and political costs. 
The thesis uses an economic incentives framework to examine six firm 
specific characteristics that may affect the utility of segment information and 
voluntary disclosure of additional segment information data. These firm 
characteristics are finn size, industry membership, minority interest, financial 
leverage, firm diversification and ownership diffusion. 
The prior research studies by McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) found no support for the firm diversification 
variable. This unexpected result motivated a new conception and measurement 
of the firm diversification variable in this thesis. Highly diversified firms are 
firms that have diversified into different industry segments and/or geographical 
segments. This is an objective measure as the level of firm diversification can 
be assessed from the segment information provided in the company's annual 
reports. 
This variable is of particular significance in this thesis as firm 
diversification is likely to be an important attribute in management's decision 
to provide voluntary disclosure of additional segment information in a 
regulated environment. This is because highly diversified firms are likely to 
have more significant information content for investors. These firms are more 
likely to disclose private information for which there is a demand, provided 
there is a net benefit in the voluntary disclosure to the firms. 
2 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) investigated the role of 
diversification into related and unrelated industries in voluntary disclosure and 
found no support for this variable. This study 1:!Xamines whether highly 
diversified firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose segment data compared 
to firms that are not highly diversified. The findings may add to our 
:Ji!Jerstanding of the importance of the rol.! of firm diversification in vol•.mtary 
disclosure of segment information. 
This research study is important or significant to undertake as it would 
contribute to theory development and practical consequences. The study 
employs the minority interest, financial leverage and ownership diffusion 
hypotheses to test agency theory and the firm size, finn diversification and 
industry membership hypotheses to test contracting theory in relation to 
voluntary segment disclosure. It fonns a link between agency costs, 
infonnation costs, political costs (contracting costs) and the accounting policy 
choice of voluntary disclosure decisions. 
This study would contribute in the theory development of information 
costs (proprietary costs) of competitive disadvantage to explain the incentives 
behind management's decision to voluntarily disclose segment data in a 
regulated setting. In particular, the finn size and firm diversification 
hypotheses highlight the role played by (contracting theory) infonnation costs 
on voluntary segment disclosure. 
The empirical results would provide a contribution to the voluntary 
corporate disclosure literature, highlighting the significance of the role of 
proprietary costs of competitive disadvantage on voluntary disclosure of 
segment infonno.tion. Finally, the empirical results would have practical 
consequences for the users of financial statements, especially the shareholders, 
management, debtholders, investors, financial analysts, regulators and 
researchers. 
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1.2.1 Firm Diversification 
The most important hypothesis of this research study is the firm 
diversification variable. After the introduction of the segment reporting 
accounting standards AAS 16 and AASB 1005 effective on or after 31 51 March 
1985 and 30111. June 1986 respectively, it became possible to access the 
disaggregated sales, earnings and assets by industry and geographical 
segments. Finn diversification by industry and geographical segments can also 
be ascertained from the segment reporting information disclosed in the 
companies' annual financial statements. 
Finn diversification can be classified into two major categories, 
namely: diversification into different industries and diversification into 
different geographical areas. The number of industry segments that a firm 
operated in measures the level of diversification. For example, a firm that 
operated in si.'t industry segments would be considered to be at a higher level of 
diversification than a firm that operated in three industry segments. 
The nvmber of geographical segments that a firm operated in also 
measures the level of diversification. For examPle, a firm that operated in five 
geographical segments would be considered to be at a higher level of 
diversification than a firm that operated in two geographical segments. 
Since a firm can be highly diversified in industry segments and, or, 
geographical segments, the highly diversified firms variable in this thesis is 
measured by the number of industry segments or the number of geographical 
segments, whichever is the higher number of segments2• 
Through the eyes of the internal management of the company, with 
regards to segmental reporting, there is a dominant or primary segment. The 
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dominant or primary segment can be either the industry segments or 
geographic segments. The revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting prescribes 
a primary ~egment (either business segments or geographic segments) and a 
secondary segment. In this study, firm diversification is measured based on the 
number of segments in the dominant segment of the company. 
1.2.2 The Concept of a Highly Diversified Company 
The conception of a highly diversified company is a firm that is either 
highly diversified in terms of industry segments or geographical segments. 
Table 1 is an illustration of a highly diversified company based on 
diversification in industry segments. This company has diversified into five 
industry segments: 
i) Rural services and insurance 
ii) Fertilisers and chemicals 
iii) Energy 
iv) Hardware and forest products 
v) Other- investments and services 
The consolidated entity operates predominantly in Australia, that is, in one 
geographical segment. The highly diversified firms variable measured by the 
number of segments in this company is recorded as five. 
Table 2 is an illustration of a highly diversified company based on 
diversification in geographical segments. This company has diversified into 
five geographical segments: Australia, New Zealand, United States, Japan and 
Other. The economic entity operates in one industry segment. The. highly 
diversified firms variable in this company is measured and recorded as five. 
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Table 1 
Illustration of Highly Diversified Firms Concept displaying Diversification 
in Industry Segments 
Industry Segments 
Rural services and insurance 
Fertilisers and chemicals 
Energy 
Hardware and forest products 
Other - investments and 
services 
Consolidated adjustments 
Interest paid and corporate 
overheads 
Operating 
Revenue 
2000 
$000 
847,652 
403,146 
588,756 
1,498,391 
164,612 
3,502,557 
(6;784) 
3,495,773 
Segment 
Assets 
2000 
$000 
598,781 
548,140 
946,265 
861,686 
346,798 
3,301,670 
(132,910) 
3,168,760 
The consolidated entity operates predominantly in Australia. 
Earnings 
Beiore Tax 
2000 
$000 
40,144 
45,115 
107,460 
139,977 
29,666 
362,362 
(6,692) 
(58,911) 
296,759 
Note. Source: Wesfanners 2000 Segment Information Disclosures. 
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Table2 
Illustration of Highly Diversified Firms Concept disp!aying Diversification in Geographical Segments 
Geographical Segments Australia New Zealand United States Japan Other Eliminations Consolidated 
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
$000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 
Revenue outside the 9,247 4,854 7,421 2,745 124 24,391 
consolidated entity 
Inter-segment revenue 10,754 (10,754) 
Total revenue 9,247 15,608 7,421 2,745 124 (10,754) 24,391 
Segment earnings before 636 1,086 2,425 (66) (937) 254 3,398 
interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation 
Segment operating 593 470 (276) (141) (962) 254 (62) 
profit I (loss) after tax 
Total assets 79,817 24,855 54,270 3,962 283 (80,080) 83,107 
The economic entity operates in one industry, being the design, development, integration and support of telecommunications systems and 
products. 
Note. Source: Telemedia Networks International 2000 Segment Infonnation Disclosures. 
Table 3 is an illustration of a highly diversified company that has 
diversified into different industry and geographical segments. This company 
has diversified into six industry segments and four geographical segments. The 
industry segments are: 
i) Business Services 
ii) Healthcare Services 
iii) Education Services 
iv) Tourism & Leisure Services 
v) Resources & Government Services 
vi) Plastics 
The geographical segments are: 
i) Australia 
ii) New Zealand 
iii) United States of America 
iv) Hong Kong 
The highly diversified firms variable of this company (measured by the 
number of industry segments or geographical segments, whichever is the 
higher number of segments) is recorded as six. 
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Table 3 
Illustration of Highly Diversified Firms Concept displaying Diversification 
in Industry Segments and Geographical Segments 
Revenue Operating Total 
Profit Assets 
Industry Segments $000 $000 $000 
Business Services 388,742 20,528 157,344 
Healthcare Services 449,732 I0,861 149,343 
Education Services !03,963 5,296 22,788 
Tourism & Leisure Services 236,224 6,954 80,203 
Resources & Government Services 268,629 14,336 61,867 
Plastics 138,945 26,750 65,046 
Total Industry Segments 1,586,235 84,725 536,591 
Goodwill (6,741) 255,076 
Interest paid (11,094) 
Cash and loans 338 43,246 
1,586,573 66,890 834,913 
Geograpllical Segments 
Australia 1,257,472 43,574 417,329 
NewZealend 182,413 12,995 53,764 
United States of America 96,969 11,703 56,452 
Hong Kong 49,381 16,453 9,046 
Total Geographical Segments 1,586,235 84,725 536,591 
Goodwill (6,741) 255,076 
Interest paid (11,094) 
Cash and loans 338 43,246 
1,586,573 66,890 834,913 
Note. Source: Spotless Group 2000 Segment Infonnation Disclosures. 
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1.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Segment Information in a Regulated 
Environment 
The voluntary disclosure of segment infonnation by companies in a 
regulated Australian environment has not been investigated in the prior 
Australian research studies. It is a different aspect of voluntary disclosure as 
the companies are already disclosing segment information data to comply with 
the segment reporting accounting standards. 
1.3.2 The Measurement of Voluntary Disclosure 
In this thesis a sample of 200 Australian companies were examined to 
ascertain if these companies provided voluntary disclosure of segment 
information data. 
When a company complied with the accounting standards and 
displayed the mandated three segment data items (segment revenue, segment 
results and segment assets) in the industry segments and/or geographical 
segments, it is measured and recorded as a "non-voluntary disclosure" 
company. A company operating in one industry and one geographical segment 
is also measured and recorded as a "non-voluntary disclosure" company. 
\:\/hen a company displayed segment items in excess of the mandated three 
segment data items, such as inter-segment sales, other revenue, abnormal 
items, depreciation and amortisation, capital expenditure, segment liabilities 
and segment net assets in the industry segments and/or geographical segments, 
it is measured and recorded as a "voluntary disclosure" company. 
Table 4 is an illustration of a company that displayed non-voluntary 
disclosure of segment infonnation. The company displayed details of industry 
IO 
segment~ and geographical segments. The consolidated entity operated in five 
industry segments and six geographical segments. The mandated three 
segment data items: segment revenue, segment result and segment assets are 
displayed in both the industry segments and geographical segments. 
Table 5 is an illustration of voluntary disclosure of segment information 
in the industry segments. The company displayed details of industry segments 
and geographical segments. The consolidated entity operated in six industry 
segments and four geographical segments. Voluntary disclosure of segment 
information was displayed in the industry segments. A total of five segment 
data items were displayed in the industry segments: 
i) Total assets at year end 
ii) Total operating revenue 
iii) Inter-segment sales 
iv) Net external operating revenue 
v) Operating profit before income tax 
The mandated three segment data items were displayed in the geographical 
segments. 
Table 6 is an illustration of voluntary disclosure of segment infonnation 
in the geographical segments. The company displayed details of geographical 
segments. The consolidated entity operated in four geographical segments and 
one industry segment. Voluntary disclosure of segment information was 
displayed in the geographical segments. A total of six segment data items were 
displayed in the geographical segments: 
i) Sales to customers outside the consolidated entity 
ii) Inter-segment sales 
iii) Other revenue 
iv) Total revenue 
v) Operating profit before income tax 
vi) Segment assets 
11 
Table4 
Illustration of a "non~voluntary disclosure" company 
Details of industry segments _are as follows: 
Sales revenue Total assets Segment profit 
$M $M $M 
Gold 936.0 2,445.9 198.3 
Metals 178.1 428.8 26.6 
Industrial minerals 179.7 101.0 11.8 
Power and gas 62.5 44.5 3.1 
Finance and corporate 606.0 (101.4) 
1,356.3 3,626.2 138.4 
InterMsegment eliminations (32.7) 
Abnormal items (420.7) 
Consolidated total 1,323.6 3,626.2 (282.3) 
Details of geographical segments _are as follows: 
Australia 1,187.1 2,564.8 157.5 
Asia 23.9 5.8 3.0 
Europe 46.5 358.2 (41.4) 
New Zealand 43.8 86.6 3.6 
Africa 20.3 246.7 11.3 
North and South America 2.0 364.1 4.4 
1,323.6 3,626.2 138.4 
''. 
• Inter~segment eliminations 
Abnormal items (420.7) 
Consolidated total 1,323.6 3,626.2 (282.3) 
Note. Source: Nonnandy Mining 2000 Segment Inforn1ation Disclosures. 
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Table 5 
Illustration of a "voluntary disclosure" company displaying voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in the Industry segments 
Total Total Inter~ Net Operating 
assets at operating segment external profit 
year end revenue sales operating before 
income income tax 
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
$m $m $m $m $m 
Industry segments 
Beer - Australian 1,726.3 1,433.9 (76.5) 1,357.4 384.6 
-International 205.3 180.7 180.7 6.6 
Leisure and 
hospitality 769.8 873.8 873.8 110.2 
Other Carlton 
business activities 128.3 110.5 (19.2) 91.3 9.9 
Wine 1,543.7 718.1 (5.9) 712.2 154.3 
Property and 
investments 209.2 142.6 142.6 29.4 
C01porate 518.8 50.1 50.1 (44.3) 
5,101.4 3,509.7 (101.6) 3,408.1 650.7 
Unallocated 
net interest expense 65.0 
585.7 
Geographical 
segments 
Australia and Pacific 4,045.3 2,993.4 589.2 
Asia 112.5 81.7 (3.9) 
Europe 675.0 195.5 43.1 
Americas 268.6 137.5 22~3 
5,101.4 3,408.1 650.7 
Note. Source: Foster's Brewing Group 2000 Segment Information Disclosures. 
13 
Table6 
Illustration of a "voluntary disclosure" company displaying voluntary-disclosure of segment information in the Geographical 
Segments 
(a) lndustry Segments 
The activities of the entities in the consolidated entity are predominantly within a single industry, which is the development, manufacture, 
distribution and service of gaming machines and systems and the imporU1i.ion and distribution of electronic components and coin counting 
machines. 
(b) Geographical Segments 
12 months ended 31/12/00 
Sales to customers outside the 
consolidated entity 
Inter-segment sales 
Other revenue 
Total revenue 
Operating profit before income tax 
Segment assets 
Australia 
$'000 
372,390 
50,196 
12,989 
435,575 
88,464 
279,177 
New Zealand 
$'000 
37,301 
871 
38,172 
1,667 
2,820 
United States 
of America 
$'000 
97,095 
7,462 
104,557 
11,320 
51,354 
Note. Source: Aristocrat Leisure 2000 Segment Wormation Disclosures. 
Other 
$'000 
26,685 
240 
26,925 
2,491 
12,904 
Inter-segment 
elimination 
$'000 
(50,196) 
(6,000) 
(56,196) 
(6,438) 
(17,310) 
Consolidated 
$'000 
533,471 
,,15,562 
549,033 
97,504 
328,945 
1.4.1 The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) and Segment 
Reporting 
Australian Accounting Standards AAS 16 Financial Reporting by 
Segments was issued in March 1984 and Applicable Accounting Standards 
AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments was issued in April 1986. 
The standards require three principal items of information to be 
disclosed for both industry segments and geographical segments: 
i) Segment revenue (distinguishing between revenues derived from customers 
outside the entity and revenues derived from other segments) 
ii) Segment result (the difference between segment revenues and segment 
expenses) 
iii) Segment assets (the amount the asset is recorded in the accounting records 
at a particular date) 
1.4.2 Revised AASB 1005 
The revised segment reporting accounting standard AASB 1005 
Segment Reporting confonns to the revised International Accounting Standard 
IAS 14 Segment Reporting. The new AASB 1005 will significantly change the 
way many entities report segment infonnation for annual reporting periods 
beginning on or after 1st July 2001. The revised standard requires disclosure of 
information relating to business and geographical segments rather than industry 
and geographical segments. 
The objective of the_ revised standard is for externally reported segment 
infonnation to be presented on a similar basis as infonnation reported 
15 
internally for management purposes. The internal organisational and 
management structure and internal financial reports to the chief executive 
officer ~nd the board of directors (or the level of management where decisions 
as to the overall resource allocation of the business occurs) should be the 
starting point for identifying business and geographical segments and primary 
and secondary formats. 
The revised AASB 1005 provides more guidance on how to identify 
business and geographical segments which are defined on the basis of 
distinguishable components of an entity with differing risks and returns. The 
revised standard will require entities to identify their reportable business and 
geographical segments and detennine which basis of segmentation is primary 
based on the differing profitability, opportunities for growth, future prospects 
and risks they face as a result of the products and services they provide or the 
geographical areas in which they operate. 
Business segments will be an entity's primary segment reporting format 
if its risks and returns are predominantly affected by differences in the products 
and services it provides rather than differences in the geographical areas in 
which it operates. This means less extensive secondary segment disclosures 
will be required for its reportable gecgraphical segments. 
On the other hand, geographical segments must be reported in the 
primary format if an entity's risks and returns are predominantly affected by its 
operations in different countries or geographical areas. In this case disclosures 
for its reportable business segments can be provided in the less extensive 
secondary format. 
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1.4.3 The Major Changes in the Revised AASB 1005 
The new AASB 1005 requires the entity to distinguish between primary 
and secondary segments C\n the basis of whether the entity's risks and returns 
are predominantly affected by differences in the products and services the 
entity provides or by the geographical areas in which it operates (i.e. its 
business or geographical segments). 
The entity is required to provide more extensive disclosure for 
reportable primary segments as compared to secondary segments, including the 
following new disclosures for primary segments: 
i) segment liabilities 
ii) acquisitions of segment assets that are expected to be used during more than 
one annual reporting period (e.g. property, plant and equipment) 
iii) depreciation and amortisation expense 
iv) other non-cash expenses included in segment expenses 
v) the share of the net profit or loss of associates, joint ventures or other 
investees accounted for by the equity method of accounting, if substantially all 
of the investees' operations are within the segment, and the aggregate carrying 
amount of those investments, and 
vi) reconciliations of total segment liabilities to total entity liabilities. 
The entity is required to provide less ex.tensive disclosure for secondary 
segments, including information about segment revenues, segment assets and 
acquisitions of segment assets that are used for more than one annual reporting 
period. 
17 
1.5 Research Question 
AAS 16 and AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments became 
effective on or after 31st March 1985 and 30th June 1986 respectively. Prior to 
the introduction of the segment reporting accounting standards, research 
studies on voluntary segment infonnation disclosure were conducted in an 
unregulated setting. 
The revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting is effective on or after 1st 
July 2001. As a result of the changes in the segment reporting regulations, this 
thesis will be conducted in an Australian context after the introduction of AAS 
16 and AASB 1005 but priOr m the introduction of the revised AASB 1005. 
Data will be collected from the companies' annual reports for the year ended 
during the calendar year 2000. 
The research study addresses the following research question: 
What are the finn characteristics that motivate voluntary disclosure of segment 
information by Australian companies in a regulated setting? 
It is argued that firms with particular firm characteristics have 
incentives to voluntarily disclose segment information over and above that 
required by AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments because of benefits 
such as reduced contracting costs. This thesis uses an economic incentives 
framework to examine the relationship between six firm characteristics, 
namely, firm size, industry membership, minority interest, financial leverage, 
firm diversification, ownership diffusion, and voluntary disclosure of segment 
information in a regulated setting. 
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1.6 The Significance of This Research Study 
The objective of this thesis is to examine and ascertain whether 
Australian companies have economic incentives to voluntarily disclose 
additional segment infonnation over and above that required by the old AASB 
1005 Financial Reporting by Segments. 
This study differs from prior Australian voluntary segment disclosure 
studies in the following ways: 
First, prior studies were conducted in an unregulated setting. This study 
will be conducted in a regulated setting after the introduction of the segment 
reporting accounting standards AAS 16 and AASB 1005 effective on or after 
31st March 1985 and 30th June 1986 respectively. This is significant as the 
measurement of voluntary disclosure of segment infonnation can be unifonnly 
and objectively measured from the segment information disclosed by the finns. 
More importantly, the highly diversified firms vanable can be objectively 
measured from the companies' segment reporting information in a regulated 
environment. 
Second, the hypotheses in the McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) study 
were re-investigated by Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) using a different sample 
of finns and a bigger sample size. Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) re-
examined the hypotheses in the McKinnon and Dalimunthe study using the 
same sample of firms but with an alternative definition of the diversification 
variable. This thesis employs a bigger sample size, a different sample of finns, 
a new conception and measurement of Li.e firm diversification variable, and a 
different measurement for the voluntary disdosure of segment data. 
The sample of firms selected for the testing of the hypotheses differs 
from the sample of firms in prior studies. The sample of firms in this study 
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will comprise of 185 of the largest Australian publicly traded companies by 
market capitalisation listed in Personal Investor Top 300 Shares during 2001. 
The finn diversification variable is different from the diversification 
into related versus unrelated industries variable in the prior studies. The finn 
diversification variable developed in this study is used to test whether the 
management of companies with higher levels of diversification are more likely 
to voluntarily disclose segment infonnation than companies with lower levels 
of diversification. 
The voi\lntary disclosures examined in prior studies were based on the 
disclosure of three important segment data items, namely: sales, earnings and 
assets. Voluntary disclosure in this study will be classified on the basis of 
segment items in excess of the mandated three segment data items (segment 
revenue, segment result and segment assets). 
The findings will contribute to the knowledge and understanding of 
voluntary segment information disclosure as comparisons can be made 
between the results of this study conducted under a regulated setting with the 
results of prior studies conducted under an unregulated setting. If the finn 
characteristics for voluntary disclosure in this study are generally similar to 
those in the prior studies, it is an indication that finns with specific finn 
characteristics will voluntarily disclose segment information in a regulated 
environment or an unregulated environn:ient. 
The findings of the thesis would add to an understanding of firm 
characteristics and management's economic incentives for voluntary segment 
disclosure in a regulated environment. The significance of this thesis is in the 
practical implications of the research findings and its value to the regulators. 
Accounting policy makers deliberating on mandatory disclosure issues may 
consider the existence of corporate incentives to disclose information. 
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1.7.1 Resei1.rch Summary 
This thesis examines the relationship between six film characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure of segment information in a regulated setting. There 
were implications from the literature review of the previous studies that further 
research can be undertaken to re-examine the six hypotheses in the McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993) study in a regulated environment after the introduction 
of AAS 16 and AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments effective on or 
after 31st March 1985 and 30th June 1986 respectively but before the 
implementation of the revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting effective on or 
after 1st July 2001. 
The examination of ecor.orruc incentives motivating voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in a regulated setting is based on the 
hypotheses that this disclosure is expected to be greater for finns with 
particular firm characteristics such as firm size, industry membership, minority 
interest, financial leverage, firm diversification, and ownership diffusion. 
These finns, it is argued, have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment data 
because of benefits such as reduced agency costs and political costs. 
This thesis is motivated by the opportunity to study the effects of a 
different sample of firms, a larger sample size. a different measure for firm 
diven;ification,- and a regulated setting on voluntary disclosure of financial 
segment data. 
1.7.2 The Variables 
The variables that were used in this study included the dependent 
variable of voluntary disclosure of segment information and the six 
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independent variables of firm size, industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, firm diversification and ownership diffusion. Further 
discussions and characteristics of these variables are provided in Chapter 3 and 
the justification for the measurements of these variables are provided m 
Chapter 4. A brief definition of each of these variables are provided below: 
(i) Voluntary disclosure of segment disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure of segment information is the disclosure of additional 
segment information data over and above the mandated three items of 
segment revenue, segment result and segment assets. 
(ii) Fitm Size 
Firm size is the size of the economic entity measured by the total assets of 
the consolidated entity. 
(iii) Industry Membership 
Industry membership is defined as companies belonging to the same 
industry classification. Industry membership is represented by the 
resources industry comprising of gold, other metals, diversified resources 
and energy. 
(iv) Minority Interest 
Minority interest is defined as the shares in the subsidiaries of the economic 
entity that is held by outside shareholders. 
(v) Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of debt: equity+ debt 
or debt 
equity + debt 
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(vi) Finn Diversification 
Finn diversification is defined as the diversification of a company into 
different industry segments or geographical segments. The number of 
industry segments or geographical segments that the company operated in 
is the measure for the level of firm diversification. 
(vii) Ownership Diffusion 
Ownership diffusion is defined as the level (percentage) that the shares are 
widely held by the shareholders of the company. 
1.7.3 The Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested in this thesis are as follows: 
H l: Larger Australian companies arc more likely to voluntarily disclose 
additional segment information than smaller companies. 
H2: Australian companies in the mining and oil industries are more likely 
to voluntarily disclose additional segment infonnation than companies that 
are not in the mining and oil industries. 
H3: Australi!m companies with higher levels of minority interest in their 
subsidiary companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose additional 
segment infonnation than companies with lower levels of minority interest. 
H4: Australian companies with higher levels of leverage are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose additional segment information than such companies 
with lower levels of leverage. 
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HS: Australian companies with higher levels of djversification are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment information than 
companies with lower levels of diversification. 
H6: Australian companies with widely held shareholdings are more likely 
to voluntarily disclose additional segment information than such companies 
with closely held shareholdings. 
The theory development and formulation of these hypotheses are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
1.7.4 The Research Methodology 
The research methodology comprised of the sample selection, data 
collection and the research design. The initial sample consisted of 200 
companies derived from the Australian Stock Exchange top 300 companies 
ranked by market capitalisation in 2001 Personal Investor Top 300 Shares. 
Two hundred annual reports for the calendar year ended 2000 were hand 
collected. Fifteen companies comprising banks and foreign incorporated 
companies were excluded to arrive at a final sample size of 185 companies. 
Once the sample was finalised, each annual report was analysed to 
collect the data required to test the hypotheses and a data sheet based on the 
research model was completed. A survey of the 185 final sample companies in 
the data sheet revealed 65 companies are "voluntary disclosure" firms and 120 
companies are "non-voluntary disclosure" firms. 
Both univariate and multivariate tests were used to examine the 
hypotheses. The univariate tests performed were the independent samples t-
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test, a chi-square test for the categorical variable and the Mann-Whitney Test. 
The multivariate test employed is the logistic regression. 
The binary logistic regression model can be expressed as follows: 
DISCk = fto + /'!SIZEk + /Jz!NDk + fliMik + /J4LEVk + /J5DIVERSk 
+ f360Dk+ 'k 
where 
k 
DISC 
SIZE 
IND 
MI 
denotes the firm 
is 1 (0) if additional segment information is (is not) disclosed in 
2000 
is the natural log of total assets 
is industry membership coded 1 if for mining and oil operations, 
otherwise O 
is minority interest measured as the natural logarithm of one 
minus the percentage of the subsidiaries of each sample 
company that are wholly owned 
LEV is leverage measured as total liabilities divided by book value of 
DIVERS 
OD 
total assets 
is firm diversification measured by the number of industry 
segments or geographical segments 
is ownership diffusion measured by the percentage of ordinary 
shares not held by the top twenty shareholders 
is the nonnally distributed random error 
The results of the hypotheses tests are provided in Chapter 5. 
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1.8 Chapter Outline 
The thesis is organised as follows: chapter 2 reviews the rnlcvant 
literature on firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure of segment 
information. The study by Bradbury (1992) is presented first. This is followed 
by a review of the studies by McKinnon and Dalimunthe ( 1993 ), Kelly ( 1994) 
and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). Finally, the study by Aitken, Hooper and 
Pickering (1997) is presented. 
Chapter 3 reviews the theories that are used in fonnulating the 
hypotheses to be tested. Contracting theory is presented first. This is followed 
by a review of positive accounting theory and voluntary disclosure, and the 
motives for voluntary disclosure. The information problem and agency 
problem are then discussed. Finally, the six hypotheses to be tested in this 
thesis are presented. 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology relating to the research 
design, the sample selection and the data collection procedures. Both 
univariate and multivariate tests were used to examine the hypotheses. The 
univariate tests performed were the independent t-test, a chi-square test for the 
categorical variable, and the Mann-Whitney U test. The multivariate test 
employed is the logistic regression. A detailed discussion of the measurement 
for the dependent and independent variables are then presented. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results of the research. Descriptive statistics of 
the two groups of the independent variables and the univariate tests results are 
presented first. This is followed by the multivariate test results. The results of 
the hypotheses tests are then discussed. 
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Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings and the contributions of this 
thesis, acknowledges the limitations of the study and also explores the avenues 
for future research. 
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Chapter2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review looks at five prior journal article publications on 
voluntary disclosure of segment information from 1992 to 1997, namely: 
Bradbury (1992), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Kelly (1994), Mitchell, 
Chia and Loh (1995), and Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997). These prior 
studies employed an economic incentives framework to study the relationship 
between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure of segment information. 
These five studies were selected because they were studies on voluntary 
disclosure of segment data. This research study is built on these previous 
studies and hence a review of these studies is very relevant. In reviewing the 
theory, hypotheses, research methodology and research findings, the literature 
review highlights the contributions and the strengths and limitations of the 
previous studies. 
The literature review discusses the contribution in the research 
methodology by Bradbury (1992). This is followed by the contribution of 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), namely, the introduction of four 
hypotheses, and detailed measurements for the independent variables. The 
contribution by Kelly (1994) in introducing the return on investment (ROI) 
variable to test proprietary costs is then presented. This is followed by the 
contribution of Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) in re-testing a total of nine 
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hypotheses and in reconciling their research findings to that of Bradbury 
(1992) and McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). Finally, the contribution by 
Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) in developing a diversification index 
(Divindex) as an alternative measurement for the diversification into related 
versus unrelated industries variable is presented. 
2.2.1 Bradbury (1992) 
Prior to 1990 New Zealand did not regulate the reporting of segment 
data. It therefore provides a suitable setting for Bradbury (1992) to examine 
the ability of five independent variables in predicting voluntary disclosure of 
segment information in a study of a sample of 29 New Zealand companies. 
The five independent variables are firm size, financial leverage, proportion of 
assets in place, earnings volatility and source of finance. 
Agency theory was used to explain the firm size, financial leverage and 
proportion of assets in place hypotheses. The theory supporting the hypotheses 
was very briefly stated with very little detailed explanation as to how the 
theory relates to each particular hypothesis. 
The earnings volatility and source of finance hypotheses were selected 
due to prior research findings. The earnings volatility hypothesis was selected 
because a negative association has been found between earnings volatility and 
the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecast. The source of finance hypothesis 
was selected because the financial market in which a firm operates has shown 
to have an impact on the level of voluntary financial disclosure. 
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The sample was chosen from fifty of the largest New Zealand firms by 
market capitalisation in 1983. Non-diversified firms were discarded yielding a 
final sample of 29 multi-product firms. The sample size of 29 firms to test five 
hypotheses may be considered small and a larger sample size would be 
preferable to increase the confidence level of the research findings. 
Bradbury (1992) performed two separate univariate tests on the sample 
of firms. The usual univariate test of the voluntary disclosure group in 
comparison to the non-voluntary disclosure group was performed, plus the 
partial voluntary disclosure group in comparison to the full voluntary 
disclosure group. In performing the additional univariate test, the author was 
trying to establish if there are differences in firm characteristics between the 
partial and the full voluntary disclosure group. The finding between the two 
sub-groups of voluntary disclosure companies was not statistically significant. 
Bradbury (1992) contributed by employing a dichotomous logistic 
model for the multivariate test. A dummy variable was also used to proxy for 
the existence of an overseas relationship besides FTL (foreign term loans to 
total debts). A separate regression was performed using the dummy variable to 
demonstrate that the presence of multicollinearity was not a serious problem. 
The author employed the dummy variable to test the presence of 
multicollinearity because his sample size was small and it would be appropriate 
to demonstrate that the presence of multicollinearity was not a serious problem. 
Bradbury (1992) found a significant positive association between 
voluntary disclosure of financiai segment data and the firm characteristic of 
size and financial leverage. No support was found for proportion of assets in 
place, earnings volatility, and source of finance. 
30 
---------------- -
2.2.2 McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) built on the work of Bradbury (1992) 
in an Australian context. These studies employed an economic incentives 
framework to examine firm specific characteristics. McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe examined a total of six firm characteristics, namely, the firm size 
and leverage variables for which Bradbury (1992) found significant and four 
additional variables. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) contributed in introducing four 
additional independent variables, namely, diversification into related versus 
unrelated industries, ownership diffusion, level of minority interest, and 
industry membership. The authors also contributed in the development of the 
six hypotheses. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) employed Chenhall's (1979) 
classification of relatf':d and unrelated markets and technologies in classifying 
the sample of firms into two groups of companies, namely, firms that have 
diversified into related industries and firms that have diversified into unrelated 
industries. This is a very subjective task because the distinction between 
diversification into related and unrelated industries is based on the subjective 
criteria of "related/unrelated markets" and "related/unrelated technologies". 
The authors did not disclose the source or area in the annual report, for 
example "Review of Operations", they reviewed in aniving at the decision of 
whether a company has diversified into related or unrelated industries. 
The impact of proprietary cost of competitive disadvantage on 
voluntary segment disclosure was not fully discussed in relation to companies 
with high return on investment, and widely varying performance across 
business segments. Kelly (1994) examined the proprietary costs of competitive 
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disadvantage on voluntary disclosure of segment data. He concluded that finns 
with high return on investment are less likely to voluntarily disclose 
disaggregated data than companies with low return on investment. Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996) argue that proprietary costs induce firms to provide 
disaggregated data only when they have similarly performing business 
segments. Finns with widely varying performance across business segments 
have incentives to conceal these perfonnance differences from competitors by 
only reporting aggregate perfonnance. Piotroski (1999a) examined finns' 
decisions to provide additional segment disclosures. He concluded that finns 
with declining profitability and with less variability in profitability across 
industry segments are more likely to increase segment disclosures. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) employed the importance of the 
minority fraud issue and the potential of segment information to be relevant to 
an assessment of such fraud to explain voluntary segment disclosure where 
there is minority interest in the subsidiary companies of diversified finns. 
Evidence of the importance of the minority interest fraud issue were provided 
by the cases of Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd, Hurley v B.G.H. 
Nominees Pty Ltd, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd, Re 
Overton Holdings Pty Ltd, Re Humes Ltd (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993, 
p. 38). 
Agency costs arguably increase with the increase in the level of 
minority interest in the subsidiary companies of diversified firms. Therefore 
management is more likely to voluntarily disclose segment information in 
diversified companies with higher levels of minority interest than such 
compames with lower levels of minority interest. This is in line with 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe's (1993) argument that disclosure may serve to 
reduce the "potential costs" associated with the conflict of interest between 
group corporate management and minority interest shareholders. 
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McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) employed three proxies for the size 
variable, namely: total assets, number of shareholders and number of 
subsidiaries. Total assets was used to test competitive advantage and 
information production costs. The authors suggested that proprietary cost of 
competitive disadvantage is inversely related to size as smaller firms may feel 
that fuller disclosure of their activities will put them at a competitive 
disadvantage with larger companies in the industry. This contrasts the findings 
of Kelly (1994), Hayes and Lundholm (1996), and Piotroski (1999a). 
Arguably proprietary cost of competitive disadvantage is greater for companies 
with high profitability (Kelly, 1994) and widely varying performance across 
industry segments (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996) than companies with declining 
profitability and with less variability in profitability across industry segments 
(Piotroski l.999a). 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) used number of shareholders and 
number of subsidiaries to test political visibility and demand for private 
information by financial analysts. As the number of shareholders and number 
of subsidiaries are proxies for the size variable, they should be used to test the 
size hypothesis. Moreover, the number of shareholders and the number of 
subsidiaries may not be a direct measure for the size of a company. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) contributed in the measurement of 
the independent variables. Detailed dr-scription of the measurement of the 
diversification into related versus unrelated industries, ownership diffusion, 
minority interest, size, industry membership, and leverage variables were 
given. However, the diversification into related versus unrelated industries 
variable was insignificant in both the univariate and the multivariate tests. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) performed the Mestas an additional 
univariate test besides the Mann-Whitney U test. The authors empleyed the 
binary probit analysis for the multivariate test. The results of the univariate 
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and multivariate tests are consistent. Significant support was found for 
ownership diffusion, the level of minority interest in subsidiaries, firm size and 
industry membership as factors influencing the voluntary disclosure of segment 
infonnation. No support was found for leverage or diversification into related 
versus unrelated industries. 
2.2.3 Kelly (1994) 
Kelly (1994) built on the work of Bradbury (1992) and McK.mnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993). Kelly employed the return on investment (ROI) variable 
to test the proprietary cost theory and the leverage variable to test the agency 
cost theory. 
Kelly's (1994) major contribution is in the introduction of the return on 
investment (ROI) variable to test proprietary costs of competitive disadvantage. 
The expected sign of the return on investment variable is a negative sign of the 
coefficient as proprietary cost of competitive disadvantage is an economic 
disincentive for voluntary disclosure of segment data 
The sample was compiled from the largest 150 public corporations as 
listed in The Weekend Australian (30 June/1 July 1984). The final sample used 
to test the hypotheses comprised 132 multi-segment corporations: 34 disclosers 
and 98 non-disclosers. The return on investment hypothesis was used to test 
the proprietary costs of competitive disadvantage associated with disclosure 
and the financial leverage hypothesis was used to test the agency costs arising 
from non~disclosure. 
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Three control variables, namely, industry membership, firm size, and 
auditor identity were used in the multivariate probit analysis in addition to the 
explanatory variables of return on investment and financial leverage. Kelly 
(1994) created four industry dummy variables, namely, building contractors 
and suppliers, manufacturers and retailers, industrial and diversified resources, 
and others, to proxy for the industry membership control variable. Kelly 
contributed in the research methodology of creating four industry dummy 
variables to proxy for industry membership. 
The estimated coefficient for the financial leverage variable was 
statistically insignificant in the probit analysis model indicating no support for 
the financial leverage hypothesis. This finding is in contrast to Bradbury 
(1992) but in line with McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). 
The estimated coefficient of the return of investment variable is 
negative and is significant beyond the 5% level in the results of the probit 
analysis model. This means that firms with high return on investment are less 
likely to report disaggregated data than enterprises with low return on 
investment. Kelly (1994) contributed in this research finding as the empirical 
evidence highlights the importance of proprietary costs associated with 
competitor finns entering into a profitable segment of the corporation's market, 
and the effects of proprietary costs of competitive disadvantage on voluntary 
disclosure of segment data. 
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2.2.4 Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) extended earlier research by Bradbury 
(1992) and McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). The stated purpose of Mitchell 
et al.'s study is to investigate the robustness of McKinnon and Dalimunthe's 
empirical findings by employing a sample that has a relatively higher 
proportion of voluntary disclosers relative to non-disclosers. 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) employed the STATEX database over 
the period 1983 - 1987 to search for their sample of diversified firms. The 
authors selected their sample according to Aitken et al.'s (1994) specification 
that most diversified finns are large as measured by market capitalisation and 
concentrated in the following Australian Stock Exchange defined industries: 
miscellaneous services, miscellaneous and diversified industrials, and 
diversified resources. The top 25 companies on the basis of market 
capitalisation, together with companies in the miscellaneous services, 
miscellaneous and diversified industrials, and diversified resources industries 
were selected. This yielded a sample of 129 potential multi-segment finns, 
listed as at 1983, with 43 voluntary disclosers and 86 non-voluntary disclosers. 
Multi-segment firms are found in many of the Australian Stock 
Exchange 24 defined industries and not confined to miscellaneous services, 
miscellaneous and diversified industrials, and diversified resources. Arguably, 
a sample that comprises of companies across a broad number of industries is 
more representative of Australian diversified companies. This is illustrated by 
Kelly's (1994) sample, selected from the top 150 companies and yielding a 
final sample of 132 multi-segment corporations with 34 voluntary disclosers 
and 98 non-voluntary disclosers. 
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Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) presented the variables and their 
respective proxy measurements in a table. The table displayed the comparative 
variable measurements of Bradbury (1992), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
and Mitchell et al. (1995). 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) employed a dichotomous classification 
for diversification into related versus unrelated industries. The authors 
presumed that the STATEX classification of diverse industrials and diverse 
resources, by the nature of the classification, refers to companies that have 
unrelated lines-of-business within the same entity. 
Arguably, many diversified companies that are big in firm size as 
measured by market capitalisation and listed in the Australian Stock Ex.change 
(ASX) top 200 shares have unrelated lines-of-business within the same entity. 
These companies may not be listed under diversified resources or diversified 
industrials but they are listed under their core business in the various ASX 
industry groups. 
The research methodology employed by Mitchell et al. (1995) is similar 
to Bradbury (1992) in employing Spearman Correlations to test the presence of 
multicollinearity and in using Logistic Regression for the multivariate test. 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh's (1995) major contribution is in testing a total 
of nine hypotheses and in reconciling their research findings to that of 
Bradbury (1992) and McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). The authors found 
statistically significant support for the firm size, financial leverage and industry 
membership hypotheses in the multivariate logistic regression test. 
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2.2.5 Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) 
Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) extended the study of McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993). Aitken et al. (1997) was motivated by the 
diversification variable which McKinnon and Dalimunthe found to be 
insignificant. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) developed a diversification measure 
based on the technological or market relations between a firm's various 
segments. Aitken et al. (1997) argued that measures of diversification should 
be based on the relation of the earnings streams among industries, rather than 
on their technological or market relation. 
If knowledge of the earnings stream of one industry is sufficient to 
provide an investor with knowledge of the earnings stream of another industry, 
then these industries are considered related. Aitken et al. ( 1997) argued that 
management may have less incentive to provide segment disclosure for related 
industries due to a lack of infonnation value in the disclosure. 
Segment information is likely to be more useful to investors where the 
correlation among the profit streams of the firm's various segments is low. 
Therefore, diversification should be measured by the degree of correlation 
among the earnings of all the firm's segments. High (low) correlations among 
segment earnings are indicative of diversification into related (unrelated) 
industries. 
Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) contributed by developing a 
diversification index (Divindex) to measure diversification into related versus 
unrelated industries, and this resulted in a continuous diversification variable 
ranging between zero and one. 
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The diversification index is a function of both the correlation between a 
firm's segments and the dispersion of its assets across its segments. High 
correlations between segments and/or high concentration of assets in a small 
proportion of segments will provide high values of Divindex (closer to one). 
Low correlations and relatively equal investment across segments will provide 
low values of Divindex (closer to zero). 
Employing the same sample of 65 firms in the McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) study, Aitken et al. (1997) excluded 39 firms to arrive at a 
final sample of 26 firms with 11 disclosers and 15 non-disclosers. Binary 
probit analysis of segment disclosure choice was performed on this sample of 
26 firms employing Divindex to proxy for diversification into related versus 
unrelated industries. Aitken et al. (1997) found diversification strategy, firm 
size, and the level of minority interest to be significantly related to segment 
disclosure. 
2.3 Motivation for This Study 
There are implications from the literature review that further research 
can be undertaken to examine the relationship between firm characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure of segment information in a regulated environment. 
The McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) hypotheses can be re-examined 
under a regulated setting after the introduction of Australian Accounting 
Standard AAS 16 and Accounting Standard AASB 1005 Financial Reporting 
by Segments effective on or after 31 51 March 1985 and 30th June 1986 
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respectively but" before the implementation of the revised Accounting Standard 
AASE 1005 Segment Reporting effective on or after 1st July 2001. 
This thesis re-examines the six hypotheses in the McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) study under a regulated setting to ascertain whether 
diversified companies have motivation to provide additional segment data over 
and above the mandated three items of segment revenue, segment results, and 
segment assets required by Australian Accounting Standard AAS 16 and 
Accounting Standard AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments. This 
thesis examines the firm characteristics of firm size, industry membership, 
minority interest, financial leverage, firm diversification, and ownership 
diffusion. 
A new measurement was used to measure the level of firm 
diversification which differed from the measure of McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). The firm diversification in this 
thesis is measured by the number of segments which is a continuous variable. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe employed Chenhall's (1979) classification of 
related and unrelated markets and technologies using a dichotomous variable in 
classifying diversification into related versus unrelated industries. Mitchell et 
al. employed the STATEX classification of diverse industrials and diverse 
resources using a dichotomous classification. 
This firm diversification measure, that is, the number of segments, is 
possible in a regulated setting as companies are disclosing the number of 
industry segments and/or the number of geographical segments in the Notes to 
the Financial Statements under the item of Segment Reporting. 
The measurement for voluntary disclcsure in this thesis also differed 
from prior studies as this thesis is conducted under a regulated setting. A 
company that discloses more than the three mandated items of segment 
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revenue, segment results, and segment assets in its industry segments andlor 
geographical segments is classified as a "voluntary disclosure" company. A 
company that did not disclose more than the three mandated items is classified 
as a "non~voluntary disclosure" company. 
There is also implication that the theory predicting and explaining the 
hypotheses can be further developed to emphasize the importance of 
infonnation cost (also known as proprietary cost) of competitive disadvantage 
in relation to voluntary disclosure of segment information. 
This thesis is motivated by the opportunity to study the effects of a 
different sample of firms, a larger sample size, a different measure for firm 
diversification, and a regulated setting on voluntary disclosure of financial 
segment data. 
2.4Summary 
The literature review looks at five previous studies on voluntary 
disclosure of segment information. Bradbury (1992), McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993), Kelly (1994), Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995), and Aitken, 
Hooper and Pickering (1997) employed an economic incentives framework to 
study the relationship between firm specific characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure of segment infonnation. 
Bradbury (1992) tested five firm characteristics, namely: firm size, 
financial leverage, proportion of assets in place, earnings volati1ity and source 
of finance. Bradbury found a significant positive association between 
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voluntary disclosure of financial segment data and the firm characteristic of 
size and financial leverage. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) built on the work of Bradbury 
(1992). They examined a total of six finn characteristics, namely: the finn size 
and financial leverage variables for which Bradbury found significant and the 
industry membership, minority interest, finn diversification and ownership 
diffusion variables. McKinnon and Dalimunthe found significant support for 
ownership diffusion, the level of minority interest in subsidiaries, firm size and 
industry membership as factors influencing the voluntary disclosure of segment 
information. No support was found for leverage or diversification into related 
versus unrelated industries. 
Kelly (1994) introduced the return on investment (ROI) variable to test 
proprietary costs and the financial leverage variable to test agency costs 
associated with unregulated segment reporting. Kelly found a significant 
positive correlation between return on investment and voluntary segment 
disclosure. No support was found for financial leverage. 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) built on the work of Bradbury (1992) 
and McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). Mitchell et al. found voluntary 
segment disclosure is significantly related to size, leverage and mining and oil 
industry. 
Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997) extended the study of McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993). The authors developed a diversification index 
(Divindex.) to measure diversification into related versus unrelated industries. 
Aitken et al. found diversification strategy, firm size, and the level of minority 
interest to be significantly related to segment disclosure. 
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There are implications from the literature review that further research 
can be undertaken to examine the relationship between firm characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure ,--.,f segment information as the findings in the prior studies 
are not unanimous. 
This thesis builds on the work of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). This research study is motivated by the 
opportunity to study the effects of a different sample of finns, a larger sample 
size, a different measure of diversification, and a regulated setting on voluntary 
disclosure of financial segment data. 
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Chapter3 
Theory Development and Hypotheses Formulation 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous studies on voluntary disclosure of segment information have 
found a significant correlation between voluntary disclosure and firm size and 
industry membership (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell, Chia and 
Loh, 1995; Aitken, Hooper and Pickering, 1997) but differing results between 
voluntary disclosure and minority interest, ownership diffusion, financial 
leverage and firm diversification. 
This thesis will re-investigate the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and six firm characteristics, namely, finn size, industry membership, 
minority interest, financial leverage, firm diversification and ownership 
diffusion in a regulated setting. The selection of the six firm characteristics 
was done on the basis of testing the agency theory and contracting theory as 
well as to facilitate comparison of the results with prior research studies. 
Th.! theory development which closely follows Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Healy and Palepu (2001) is 
presented first. This is followed by a discussion on agency costs, infonnation 
costs, political costs and voluntary disclosure of segment information. The six 
hypotheses are then presented. 
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3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as 'a 
contract under which one or more persons [principal(s)] e.ngage another person 
[the agent] to perfonn some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent'. This causes problems (costs) 
because the agents may not always act in the best interests of the principal. 
Management may make decisions that maximise their own wealth. Losses 
resulting from such decisions and expenditures incurred to mitigate them are 
referred to as agency costs. 
Agency costs comprise of monitoring expenditure by the principals 
(e.g. cost of employing auditors), bonding expenditure by the agent (e.g. cost 
of preparing financial reporis) and a residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Management acts as agent for the shareholders and bondholders in the context 
of making decision choices and managing the firm. Two potential conflicts of 
interest exist: the shareholders and management conflict, giving rise to agency 
cost of equity; and the bondholders and shareholders/management conflict, 
giving rise to agency cost of debt. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) studied contracts between bondholders and 
shareholders/management and between shareholders and management. These 
contracts arise to minimise the costs associated with the conflicts of interest 
between the parties. Since accounting measurements are used to enforce many 
of the contracts, agency theory is· used to explain the choice in methods of 
accounting measurements and segment disclosure choice. Voluntary disclosure 
of additional segment infonnation over and above that required by AASE 1005 
is an accounting choice decision by management. 
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Voluntary additional segment information disclosure can reduce the 
agency cost of equity as segmer.t information is considered useful additional 
infonnation to shareholders about the outcomes of decisions made by 
management. Voluntary additional segment information disclosure can also 
reduce the agency cost of debt by facilitating debt suppliers with information to 
make better predictions about the growth, ability to extinguish debt, and risk 
and return prospects of a diversified group of companies. 
3.2.2 Contracting Theory 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1990) suggest that contracting costs is an 
important factor in offering an explanation of accounting practice. Contracting 
costs incorporated a wide variety of costs and included the agency costs 
specified in agency theory from Jensen and Meck1ing (1976). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) identified that contracting costs consist 
of transaction costs (e.g., brokerage fees), agency costs (e.g., monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and the residual loss from dysfunctional decisions), information 
costs (e.g., the costs of becoming informed), renegotiation costs (e.g., the costs 
of rewriting existing contracts because the extant contract is made obsolete by 
some unforeseen event), and bankruptcy costs (e.g., the legal costs of 
bankruptcy and the costs of dysfunctional decisions). 
Contracting costs arise in (i) market transactions (e.g., selling new debt 
or equity requires legal fees and underwriting costs), (ii) transactions internal to 
the finn (e.g., a cost~based transfer price scheme is costly to maintain and can 
produce dysfunctional decisions), and (iii) transactions in the political process 
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(e.g., securing government contracts or avoiding government regulation 
requires lobbying costs). 
Accounting researchers have recently returned to using the notion of an 
efficient set of accounting methods to explain accounting choice (Zimmer 
1986). In competition among firms, those that organise themselves to 
minimise contracting costs are more likely to survive (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
This suggests that accounting methods affect the firm's organisational costs 
and so the accounting choice methods that survive are those that minimise 
contracting costs. This also suggests that agency and other costs would also 
affect accounting choice. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that within the firm the lack of a 
market price is replaced by systems for allocating decisions among managers, 
and measuring, rewarding and punishing managerial performance. Accounting 
plays a role in these systems and so is a part of the finn's efficient contracting 
technology. 
Contracts that use accounting numbers are not effective in aligning 
managers' and contracting parties' interest if managers have complete 
discretion over the reported accounting numbers. Hence, we expect some 
restrictions on managers' discretion over accounting numbers, but some 
discretion will remain. When managers exercise this discretion it can increase 
the wealth of all contracting parties, or increase the wealth of the managers at 
the expense of some other contracting party or parties. If managers elect to 
exercise discretion to their advantage and the discretion has wealth re-
distributive effects among the contracting parties, then we say the managers 
acted .. opportunistically". 
Ex ante, the set of accounting choices restricted by the contracting parties 
is determined by "efficiency" factors to maximise finn value. Ex post, wealth 
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is redistributed by managerial opportunism, but ex ante some redistribution 
was expected and the parties price protect their interests. Price protection does 
not eliminate the incentive to act opportunistically nor does price protection 
eliminate the costs of managers taking opportunistic actions. The extent to 
which contracts can be written ex ante to prevent such ex post opportunistic 
behaviour increases the chance that the firm will survive in a competitive 
environment (Klein, 1983). 
The set of accounting procedures within which managers have 
discretion is called the "accepted set", and is detennined by the contracting 
parties. Contracting parties include management, shareholders, bondholders, 
suppliers, customers and employees. Managerial discretion over accounting 
method choice (i.e. the "accepted set") is predicted to vary across firms with 
the variation in the costs and benefits of restrictions. These restrictions 
produce the "best" or "accepted" accounting principles even without mandated 
accounting standards by government and are enforced by external auditors 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1990, p. 136). 
Accounting choice affects the contracting parties' wealth and depends 
on the relative magnitudes of the contracting costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). To understand the concern of management with the accounting policies 
used in external financial reporting requires identifying how accounting 
methods affect management's wealth. Incentive remuneration is affected by 
the firm's financial reports, both directly and via the stock market. The 
reported earnings in the financial reports could change the level of bonus 
payments, direct cash flow effects (e.g. tax effects) and expected cash flow 
impacts (e.g. debt covenants, political costs). 
Voluntary disclosure decision is an accounting policy choice of the 
management of the firm. Agency costs, political costs and information costs 
are contracting costs and the management of the finn will select the accounting 
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policy choice of voluntary disclosure to minimise contracting costs provided 
there is a net benefit in the voluntary disclosure decision. 
Contracting costs arise in transactions in the political process (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1990). Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) contend that a 
firm's political visibility may be an important determinant of management's 
choice of accounting policy. Politically visible firms make accounting choices 
that they perceive will reduce the political costs imposed by the government, 
its regulatory agencies and private interest groups. 
Information costs are contracting costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
Kelly (1994) investigated the relationship between information costs, also 
known as proprietary costs, and voluntary disclosure of segment data. 
Proprietary costs of disclosure constitute: (i) the expenditure incurred in 
generating and disseminating accounting infonnation and (ii) the cost 
associated with publishing financial information which is commercially 
valuable and potentially damaging to a corporation's prospects. The relative 
magnitude of proprietary costs or information costs depends on: (i) the release 
of unfavourable information that conveys negative expectations about a firm's 
future cash flows and (ii) the probability that shareholders, debtholders, 
potential entrants will benefit from favourable accounting disclosures 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 1990b; Wagenhofer, 1990). 
Edwards and Smith (1996) investigated the cost of providing 
infonnation in contrast to the associated benefits. In relation to segmental 
reporting, the information costs have been described as including the full range 
of collection, processing and dissemination costs, and also the cost of 
competitive disadvantage. 
Several researchers hypothesize that firms' decisions to disclose 
infonnation to investors is influenced by concern that such disclosures can 
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damage their competitive position in product markets (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltham and Xie, 1992; 
Newman and Sansing, 1993; Darrough, 1993; Gigler, 1994). These studies 
conclude that firms have an incentive not to disclose infonnation that will 
reduce their competitive position, even if it makes it more costly to raise 
additional equity. However, this incentive appears to be sensitive to the nature 
of the competition, in particular whether firms face existing competitors or 
merely the threat of entry, and on whether firms compete primarily on the basis 
of price or long-run capacity decisions. 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that proprietary costs induce firms 
to provide disaggregated data only when they have similarly performing 
business segments. Firms with widely varying performance across business 
segments have incentives to conceal these performance differences from 
competitors by only reporting aggregate performance. 
Piotroski (1999a) examines firms' decisions to provide additional 
segment disclosures. He concludes that firms with declining profitability and 
with less variability in profitability across industry segments are more likely to 
increase segment disclosures, consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
3.3 Agency Costs, Information Costs, Political Costs and Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Research using the contracting perspective finds that accounting 
decisions are influenced by compensation and debt contracts, as well as 
political cost considerations (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Contracts between 
management and shareholders are known as compensation contracts and 
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contracts between the firm and its creditors are known as debt contracts. 
Political cost considerations include managements' concern about attracting 
explicit and implicit taxes or regulatory actions. This thesis examines the 
effects of agency costs, information costs and political costs on voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in a regulated setting. 
The agency cost of equity arises because shareholders delegated the 
responsibility of management to the managers. Consequently the managers 
have an incentive to make decisions that expropriate shareholders' funds by 
acquiring perquisites, pay excessive compensation, or make investment or 
operating decisions that are harmful to the interests of the shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
Compensation contracts can be used to solve this agency problem. 
Managers are directly rewarded using a variety of stock-based compensation 
plans, such as stock option grants and stock appreciation rights. Managers 
have incentives to engage in voluntary disclosures under these types of 
compensation plans. Managers interested in trading their stock holdings have 
incentives to disclose private information to meet restrictions imposed by 
insider trading rules. Restrictions on insider trading provide managers with 
incentives to make voluntary disclosures to correct any perceived 
undervaluation prior to the expiration of stock option awards (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). 
Managers acting in the interests of existing shareholders have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosures to reduce contracting costs 
associated with stock compensation for new employees. Stock compensation 
is more likely to be an efficient form of remuneration for managers and owners 
if stock prices are a precise estimate of firm values. Otherwise, managers will 
demand additional compensation to reward them for bearing any risk 
associated with under~valuation. Finns that use stock compensation 
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extensively are therefore likely to provide additional disclosure to reduce the 
risk of undervaluation (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
show that firms delay disclosure of good news and accelerate the release of bad 
news prior to stock option awards periods, consistent with managers making 
disclosure decisions to increase stock-based compensation. 
The agency cost of debt arises because managers have an incentive to 
make decisions that expropriate debtholders' funds by issuing additional more 
senior claims, by paying out dividends or by taking on high risk capital projects 
(Smith and Warner, 1979). The issuance of new senior debt and payment of 
dividends reduces the likelihood of sufficient resources available to fully repay 
existing of lower priority debt in the event of financial distress. Risky 
investment projects increase the likelihood of both good outcomes that 
disproportionately benefit the shareholders, and bad outcomes that are 
disproportionately borne by debtholders. 
Debt contracts seek to align the interests of management with those of 
debtholders. These contracts frequently require management to disclose 
relevant information that enable debtholders to monitor compliance with 
contractual agreements and to evaluate whether management have managed the 
firm's resources in their interests. Management have incentives to voluntarily 
disclose segment information to reduce the agency cost of debt. 
Voluntary disclosure studies assume that managers have superior 
information to shareholders, debtholders and investors on the finm;' expected 
future performance even in an efficient capital market. Where there is 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, debtholders 
and investors, financial analysts collect information from public and private 
sources, evaluate the current performance, make earnings forecasts and 
recommendations to investors. Verrecchia (1983) notes that where there is a 
demand for private infonnation by investors, its non-disclosure is likely to be 
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interpreted as bad news and hence adversely affect firm value. Thus 
management have incentive to voluntarily disclose segment information to 
facilitate better assessment of the firm's performance. 
Information costs includes the full range of collection, processing and 
dissemination costs and also the cost of competitive disadvantage (Kelly, 1994; 
Edwards and Smith, 1996). There are two major forces in the information 
costs influencing voluntary disclosure: (i) the cost of providing information and 
(ii) the corresponding associated benefits. Firms will voluntarily disclose 
segment information provided the increase in finn value from disc:losure will 
offset the decrease in finn value from proprietary costs. This argument is 
reinforced where there is an increase in finn value as management may be 
rewarded with an increase in bonus payments and an increase in the value of 
their share options. 
There is a theoretical relationship between industry membership and 
political costs, whereby a certain industry is subjected to greater political 
scrutiny than others, for example, the resources industry (Ball and Foster, 
1982~ Craswell and Taylor, 1992). The resources industry is politically 
sensitive and this may be attributable to its strategic importance as a major 
employer, a major export earner and an important supplier of energy and raw 
materials to other industries. 
Certain industries may attract scrutiny from government agencies and 
special interest groups because of their strategic importance. The oil and gas 
industry in the USA has often beerr suggested as an example of such an 
industry (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). Similarly the political sensitivity of the 
oil and mining industry has also been noted in Australia (Sidhu and Whittred, 
1992). These companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose additional 
segment information in order to reduce the political costs imposed by the 
government, its regulatory agencies and private interest groups. 
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Vohmtary disclosure of segment information is dependent on many 
factors including agency costs, political costs and information costs 
(proprietary costs) and it is the overall effect of these contracting costs acting 
together at the same time which would result either in voluntary or non~ 
voluntary disclosure of segment information. 
3.4 Hypotheses Formulation 
The six hypotheses in this thesis focus on a test of the contracting 
theory and agency theory. Specifically, the firm size variable and the firm 
diversification variable are used as a test of the contracting theory (infonnation 
costs), the industry membership variable is employed to test the contracting 
theory (political costs), and the minority interest, financial leverage, and 
ownership diffusion variables are used as a test of the agency theory (agency 
costs). 
Prior Australian voluntary disclosure of segment information studies 
also employed the agency theory and contracting theory to test the hypotheses. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) and Aitken, 
Hooper and Pickering ( 1997) employed contracting theory to test the 
diversification into related versus unrelated industries hypothesis, the finn size 
hypothesis, and the industry membership hypothesis; and agency theory to test 
the ownership diffusion, minority interest and leverage hypotheses. Kelly 
(1994) employed the contracting theory (proprietary costs) to test the return on 
investment hypothesis and the agency theory to test the leverage hypothesis. 
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The following six hypotheses are formulated for testing to facilitate 
comparison of the results of this thesis with prior research studies. 
3.5.1 Firm Size Hypothesis 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 134) state that contracting costs 
consist of transaction costs, agency costs, infonnation costs (e.g. the costs of 
becoming informed), renegotiation costs and bankruptcy costs. 
Edwards and Smith (1996) and Kelly (1994) investigated the cost of 
providing information in contrast to the associated benefits. [n relation to 
segment reporting, the information costs have been described as including the 
full range of collection, processing and dissemination costs, and the cost of 
competitive disadvantage. 
Ke1ly (1994) found that finns with high return on investment are Jess 
likely to report disaggregated data than those with low return on investment 
due to information costs of competitive disadvantage with competitor firms 
entering into a profitable segment of the corporation's market. 
Larger companies are more likely to have a larger financial analysts' 
and investors' fo1lowing. Where there is infonnation asymmetry between 
management and investors, financial analysts collect information from public 
and private sources, evaluate the current performance of firms that they follow, 
make earnings forecasts and recommendations to investors. Verrecchia (1983) 
notes that where there is a demand for private information by investors, non-
disclosure of the information is likely to be interpreted as bad news and hence 
adversely affect firm valut!. Hence, management will weigh the costs of 
disclosure versus the costs of non-disclosure, and voluntary disclosure is more 
55 
likely where there is a net benefit from disclosure to the firm. Hypothesis 1 is 
stated as follows: 
Hl: Larger Australian companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
additional segment infonnation than smaller companies. 
3.5.2 Industry Membership Hypothesis 
Industry membership has been identified to affect accounting policy 
choice method and voluntary disclosure. Certain industries may attract 
scrutiny from government agencies and special interest groups because of their 
strategic importance. The oil and gas industry in the USA has often been 
suggested as an example of such an industry (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990, p. 
35). In Australia, the mining and oil industry is politically sensitive and this 
may be attributable to its strategic importance. 
There will be a trade-off by management in weighing up the proprietary 
costs and political costs of voluntary disclosure. Greater disclosure of 
proprietary infonnation will increase proprietary costs (especially the costs of 
competitive disadvantage), but will reduce political costs (especially the 
deflection of unwanted scrutiny by external regulators). 
Companies with operations in the mining and oil industry are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment infonnation in order to reduce 
the political costs imposed by the government, its regulatory agencies and 
private interest groups. Craswell and Taylor (1992, p. 300) suggest that finns 
that are susceptible to political costs will disclose additional infonnation as a 
means of enhancing their corporate image. Hypothesis 2 is stated as follows: 
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H2: Australian companies in the mining and oil industries are more likely 
to voluntarily disclose additional segment infonnation than companies that 
are not in the mining and oil industries. 
3.5.3 MinorH.y Interest Hypothesis 
Minority interest is the sha~s in subsidiaries of the parent company that 
are held by outside or minority shareholders. Consolidated financial 
statements provide information to the shareholders of diversified finns on the 
performance and financial position of the company and its controlled entities. 
The separation of ownership and control by the outside shareholders 
delegating the responsibility to the managers for managing the business give 
rise to an agency problem. The managers can use the corporate funds to 
acquire perquisites, pay excessive compensation or make investment or 
operating decisions that are harmful to the interests of minority interest 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981) note the increase in agency costs associated with the increasing 
separation of the management from the owners of the finn. The potential 
benefits of voluntary disclosure increase with shareholders and management 
conflicts and therefore increase with minority interest shareholders in the 
subsidiaries of the parent company. 
Additional segment information over and above that required by AASB 
1005 Financial Reporting by Segments provides useful infonnation for 
minority shareholders. This voluntary disclosure may serve to reduce the 
potential agency costs associated with the conflict of interest between 
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management and the minority interest shareholders. Hypothesis 3 is stated as 
follows: 
H3: Australian companies with higher levels of minority interest in their 
subsidiary companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose additional 
segment infonnation than companies with lower levels of minority interest. 
3.5.4 Financial Leverage Hypothesis 
The agency problem arises because investors (debtholders) delegated 
the responsibility of management of the firm to the managers. Consequently, 
once investors have invested their funds in a business, the managers have an 
incentive to make decisions that expropriate debtholders' funds. 
Management can expropriate the value of the debtholders' investment 
by issuing additional more senior claims, by paying out the cash received from 
investors as a dividend, or by taking on high risk capital projects (Smith and 
Warner, 1979). The issuance of new senior debt and payment of dividends 
reduces the likelihood of sufficient resources available to fully repay existing 
or lower priority debt in the event of financial distress. Also the poor earnings 
outcomes of risky investment projects are disproportionately borne by the 
debtholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) suggested 
that agency costs are higher for firms with high levels of debt in their capital 
structure, and that voluntary disclosure can reduce these costs by facilitating 
debt suppliers' assessment of a firm's ability to meet its debt. 
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Voluntary disclosure of additional segment information may allow debt 
suppliers to make better predictions about the growth, future earnings, cash 
flow, and the risk and return prospects of a company, or group of companies. 
Hence it is hypothesized that: 
H4: Australian companies with higher levels of leverage are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose additional segment information than such companies 
with lower levels of leverage. 
3.5.5 Firm Diversification Hypothesis 
According to Aitken, Czernkowski and Hooper (1994), most diversified 
firms are large as measured by market capitalisation and concentrated in the 
following Australian Stock Exchange defined industries: miscellaneous 
services, miscellaneous and diversified industrials and diversified resources. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993, p. 36) drawing on the work of 
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) suggest that where management has 
private information that is useful to investors in assessing firm value, the 
benchmark outcome of analytical models of voluntary disclosure is that if the 
information can be credibly revealed without cost, then disclosure will occur. 
Highly diversified firms are :more likely to have a larger financial 
analysts' following. Where there is information asymmetry between 
management and investors, financial analysts collect information from public 
and private sources, evaluate the current performance of firms that they follow, 
make earnings forecasts and recommendations to investors. Highly diversified 
firms are likely to have more information content for investors and so there 
will be a greater demand for segment disclosure by these firms, Verrecchia 
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(1983) notes that where there is a demand for private infonnation by investors, 
its non-disclosure is likely to be interpreted as bad news and hence adversely 
affect finn value. Hence highly diversified companies are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose additional segment information. 
Managers are directly rewarded usmg a variety of stock-based 
compensation plans, such as stock option grants and stock appreciation rights. 
Managers have incentives to engage in voluntary disclosures under these types 
of compensation plans to reduce the risk of undervaluation (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). 
Verrecchia (1983), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Kelly (1994), and 
Edwards and Smith (1996) noted the importance of proprietary costs of 
disclosure. Proprietary costs refer to the costs imposed on the firm if 
information disclosed can be used by external parties such as competitors in a 
way that is harmful to the firm. Therefore highly diversified firms will disclose 
private information for which there is a demand, provided that the increase in 
firm value from disclosure will offset the decrease in finn value from 
proprietary costs. This argument is reinforced by an increase in firm value 
because management have incentives to voluntarily disclose additional 
segment informatiOn as an increase in firm value may increase their bonus 
payments and the value of their share options. Hypothesis 5 is stated as 
follows: 
H5: Australian companies with higher levels of diversification are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additiona1 segment information than 
companies with lower levels of diversification. 
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3.5.6 Ownership Diffusion Hypothesis 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981) noted the increase in agency costs associated with the increasing level 
of non-owner management in the finn. These agency costs arise from the 
separation of the principals (shareholders) from the decision-making function 
in the firm. Where a firm's shares are widely held, there is a greater separation 
between the firm's decision-making function and its principals than where the 
firm's shares are held by a relatively small number of shareholders (Schipper, 
1981; Craswell and Taylor, 1992). Hence it is expected that the agency costs 
of equity will be higher where a firm's shares are widely held. 
One way of reducing these agency costs may be through the voluntary 
provision of additional information to the principals about the outcomes of the 
decisions made by the agent on the principals' behalf (Watts, 1977; Whittred, 
1987; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Disclosure of 
additional segment data may be considered useful information to shareholders 
about the outcomes of decisions made by management. Additional segment 
information over and above that required by AASB 1005 Financial Reporting 
by Segments allow shareholders to better assess the risk, return and growth 
prospects of the firm by industry segments and geographical segments. Such 
disclosure may reduce agency costs. Hence there are incentives for the 
management of companies with widely held shareholdings to voluntarily 
disclose additional segment information. Hypothesis 6 is stated as follows: 
H6: Aus1'ra!:~n companies with widely held sharehold:ngs are more likely 
to voluntarily disclose additional segment information than such companies 
with closely held shareholdings. 
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3.6Summary 
The theoretical frameworks employed in this research study are agency 
theory and contracting theory. Compensation contracts are employed to 
resolve the potential conflicts of interest between the shareholders and 
managers giving rise to agency cost of equity. Debt contracts are employed to 
resolve the bondholders and shareholders/managers conflict giving rise to 
agency cost of debt. Management may voluntarily disclose additional segment 
information to reduce these agency costs. 
Compensation contracts and debt contracts align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders and debtholders. Managers are 
directly rewarded using a variety of compensation plans, such as stock option 
grants and stock appreciation rights. Managers have incentives to maximise 
finn value under these compensation plans as they may be rewarded with an 
increase in bonus payments and an increase in the value of their share options. 
There are two forces influencing voluntary disclosure in information 
costs: (i) the cost of providing information and (ii) the corresponding 
associated benefits. Where there is a demand for private information by 
shareholders, debtholders and investors, its non.disclosure is likely to be 
interpreted as bad news and hence adversely affect firm value. Managers have 
incentives to voluntarily disclose additional segment information if there is a 
net benefit in disclosure. 
Certain industries may attract a disproportionate share of scrutiny from 
government agencies and special interest groups. These companies are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment infonnation to reduce the 
likelihood of political costs. Political considerations include managers' 
concern about attracting explicit and implicit tax.es, or regulatory actions. 
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Six hypotheses are fonnulated for testing to facilitate comparison of the 
results of this thesis with McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia 
and Loh (1995). The six hypotheses focus on a test of the contracting theory 
and agency theory. The finn size and finn diversification hypotheses are used 
as a test of the contracting theory, infonnation costs. The industry membership 
hypothesis is employed to test the contracting theory, political costs. The 
minority interest, financial leverage and ownership diffusion hypotheses are 
used as a test of the agency theory. 
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Chapter4 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The research methodology comprises the research design, the sample 
selection, the data collection, and the measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables. This chapter will first discuss the research design. 
Next, the sample selection is presented. This is followed by the data collection. 
Lastly, the measurement of the dependent and independent variables are 
presented and discussed. 
4.2 The Research Design 
The purpose of the research design section is to describe how the six 
hypotheses will be tested. First, descriptive statistics of the continuous 
independent variables displaying the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation of the "voluntary disclosure" group and the "non-voluntary 
disclosure" group are designed to examine the statistics of the two groups of 
companies. 
Second, the univariate tests are designed to examine the six hypotheses. 
The Levene's test for equality of variances will be performed on all the 
continuous variables to test whether they conform to a normal distribution. 
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Natural logarithm transformation will be performed on the variables that are 
skewed (do not confonn to a normal distribution). The parametric t-test will be 
performed to provide robust results in the univariate test and a Chi-square test 
will be performed for the categorical variable. The non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U test will also be run and displayed for comparison purposes. 
Third, Pearson correlation is designed to test the presence of 
multicollinearity between the continuous variables. A Pearson correlation 
matrix for the continuous variables will be presented displaying the 
correlations among the independent variables. 
Lastly, the research design employs the multivariate logistic regression 
to test the six hypotheses for voluntary disclosure of additional segment 
information. The multivatiate logistic regression is a more robust test than the 
univariate t-test. This is because, in the univariate test, the variable is tested in 
isolation from the other variables. Logistic regression examines the combined 
ability of all variables to explain the decision to voluntarily disclose. It 
provides an indication of the statistical significance of individual independent 
variables, as well as for the overall modei3. 
The logistic model can be expressed as follows: 
DISCk = Po+ P1SIZEk+ PzINDk+ f%Mik+ P4LEVk+ /15DIVERSk 
+P60Dk+ 'k 
where 
k 
DISC 
SIZE 
denotes the firm 
is 1 (0) if additional segment infonnation is (is not) disclosed in 
2000 
is the natural logarithm of total assets 
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IND is industry membership coded 1 if for mining and oil operations, 
otherwise O 
MI is minority interest measured as the natural logarithm of one 
minus the percentage of the subsidiaries of each sample 
company that are wholly owned 
LEV is leverage measured as total liabilities divided by book value of 
DIVERS 
OD 
E 
total assets 
is finn diversification measured by the number of industry 
segments or geographical segments 
is ownership diffusion measured by the percentage of ordinary 
shares not held by the top twenty shareholders 
is the normally distributed random error 
4.3 The Sample Selection 
The research methodology employs the sample selection to select the 
target companies' annual reports from which the data for the hypotheses testing 
is obtained. 
Sample selection begins with a list of companies from 2001 Personal 
Investor Top 300 Slzares4. Top 300 Shares ranks public listed companies based 
on market capitalisation and is the top 300 companies traded in the Australian 
Stock Exchange. The companies for the sample were selected from these top 
300 companies traded .jn the Australian Stock Exchaflge (ASX) from January 
to December 20015. A sample of companies drawn from the ASX top 300 
companies allows for an examination of voluntary disclosure of segment 
information in both the industry segments and geographical segments. This is 
because the Australian Stock Exchange top 300 companies are likely to have 
geographical segments besides industry segments. 
66 
l 
The year 2000 annual reports (that is, companies' annual reports for the 
year ended 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000) were requested from 
companies listed in 2001 Personal Investor Top 300 Shares. The first 200 
annual reports received are taken as the initial sample of companies for data 
collection 6. 
Fifteen companies were excluded from the initial sample of 200 
companies to arrive at a final sample size of 185 companies as shown in Table 
1. Banks were not included in the final sample of companies as they tend to 
have atypical asset struc:tures and high financial leverage. Foreign 
incorporated companies were also excluded as financial data were reported in a 
foreign currency and not in Australian dollars. A list of the final sample of 185 
companies is provided in Table i7. 
Table 1 
Largest Australian Publicly Traded Companies* 
(Listed in Personal Investor Top 300 Shares during 2001) 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Initial sample of companies 
Banks 
Foreign companies (companies not incorporated in Australia) 
Final sample of companies 
Note. *Largest finns based on market capitalisation. 
200 
( 7) 
( 8) 
185 
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Table 2 
Final Sample of 185 Companies 
Adelaide Brighton 
Amalgamated Holdings 
Amcil 
Amcor 
AMP Diversified Property Trust 
AMP Shopping Centre Trust 
Amrad Corporation 
Anaconda Nickel 
APN News and Media 
Aristocrat Leisure 
Ausdoc Group 
Austar United Communications 
Australian Foundation Investment 
Australian Growth Properties 
Australian Gas Light Company 
Australian Infrastructure Fund 
Australian Worldwide Exploration 
Austrim Nylex 
Bendigo Mining NL 
BHP 
Biota Holdings 
Bora I 
Brambles Industries 
Bristile 
BRL Hardy 
BT Australian Equity Management 
BT Office Trust 
Bunnings Warehouse Property 
Bums, Philp & Company Ltd 
Burswood 
Cable and Wireless Optus 
Caltex Australia 
Campbell Brothers 
Capra( Aluminium 
Cel\net Telecommunications 
Central Equity 
Central Pacific Minerals NL 
Challenger International 
Circadian Technologies 
Clough 
Coal & Allied 
Coates Hire 
Coca·Cola Amatil 
Cochlear 
Coles Myer 
Colorado Group 
Combined Communications Net 
Corporate Express Australia 
Coventry Group 
Crane Group 
Cranswick Premium Wines 
CSL 
CSR 
Data Advantage 
David Jones 
Davnet 
Delta Gold 
Djerriwarrh Investments 
Downer EDI 
Ecorp 
Energy Developments 
Energy Resources Of Australia 
Envestra 
ERG 
F H Paulding & Co Limited 
Foodland Associated 
Foster's Brewing Group 
Freedom Group 
Futuris Corporation 
Gandel Retail Trust 
George Weston Foods 
Goldfields 
Goodman Fielder 
Goodman Hardie Industrial 
Grain Corp 
Great Southern Plantations 
Gunns 
GW A International 
Hansen Technologies 
Henry Walker Eltin Group 
Hills Industries 
Housewares International 
HPAL 
Hutchison Telecommunications 
!Iuka Resources 
Incitec 
lnfomedia 
Institute of Drug Technology 
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Final Sample or 185 Companies 
Intellect Holdings 
Investor Group 
James Hardie Industries 
John Fairfax Holdings 
Lang Corporation 
Leighton Holdings 
Lion Nathan 
Macquarie Corporate Telecom 
Matrix. Oil 
Mayne Nickless 
Metabolic Pharmaceuticals 
Metal Stonn 
Metcash Trading 
Miller's Retail 
Milton Corporation 
M.I.M. Holdings 
Murchison United NL 
MYOB 
National Foods 
Newcrest Mining 
News Corporation 
Nonnandy Mining 
Novogen 
Novus Petroleum 
Nu farm 
Oil Company Of Australia 
Open Telecommunications 
OPSM 
Orbital Engine Corporation 
Orica 
Origin Energy 
Pacific Dunlop 
Pacific Hydro 
Pacifica Group 
Pacmin Mining Corporation 
Paperlinx. 
Pasminco 
Pcptech 
Platinum Capital 
PMP Communications 
Portman 
Pracom 
Primary Health Care 
Prime Television 
Programmed Maintenance 
Publishing and Broadcasting 
QBE Insurance Group 
Queensland Cotton Holdings 
Ramsay Healthcare 
Ranger Minerals 
Redtlex Holdings 
Reece Australia 
Ridley Corporation 
ROC Oil Company 
Rural Press 
Santos 
Seven Network 
Silex. Systems 
Simeon Wines 
Simsmetal 
Singleton Group 
Skilled Engineering 
Smorgan Steel 
Snack Foods 
Solution 6 Holdings 
Sonic Healthcare 
Sons of Gwalia 
Southcorp 
Southern Pacific Petroleum NL 
Spotless Group 
Stargames 
Strathfield Group 
Sunraysia Television 
Symex Holdings 
Tab 
Tabcorp Holdings 
Technology One 
Telemedia Networks International 
Television & Media Services 
Telstra Corporation 
Ticor 
Toll Holdings 
Tourism Asset Holdings 
Transurban City Link 
Uecomm 
Union Capital 
United Energy 
Village Roadshow 
Vision Systems 
Volante Group 
WMC 
Wesfanners 
West Australian Newspapers 
Westfield Holdings 
Westfield Trust 
Woodside Petroleum 
Woolworths 
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4.4 Data Collection 
A data sheet was designed for collecting and recording the required 
data to test the hypotheses. The data required for testing the firm size, minority 
interest, financial leverage, firm diversification, and ownership diffusion 
hypotheses were extracted from the 185 final sample companies' annual 
reports. The data required to test the industry membership hypothesis is a 
dichotomous classification and is obtained from the Australian Stock Exchange 
24 defined industry groups. 
The data for the dependent variable, disclosure, is a dichotomous 
classification and is obtained from the 185 final sample companies' annual 
reports. Companies that disclosed additional segment data over and above the 
3 items required under the old Accounting Standard AASB 1005, namely: 
segment revenue, segment results and segment assets are classified as 
"voluntary disclosure" finns8. Companies that disclosed the 3 items of 
segment data required by the old Accounting Standard AASB 1005 or that they 
are operating in one industry and one geographical segment are classified as 
"non- voluntary disclosure" firms. 
Kelly (1994) in his study on the impact of proprietary costs on 
Australian unregulated segment reporting, compiled his sample from the 
largest 150 public corporations as listed in The Weekend Australian (30 June/I 
July 1984). His final sample of 132 corporations consisted of 34 disclosers and 
98 non-disclosers. In line with Kelly's final sample, the final sample of 
companies in this research study included those companies operation in one 
industry and one geographic segment. 
As one of the disincentives for voluntary segment disclosure is 
proprietary costs (especially the costs of competitive disadvantage), a full study 
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should include those companies operation in one industry and one geographic 
segment in the dichotomisation of companies as voluntary versus non-
voluntary disclosure, to examine the firm characteristics, contracting costs and 
voluntary segment disclosure. 
Each of the 185 companies' annual reports were analysed and the 
required data were extracted and recorded in the data sheet. Once the 
recording of the data in the data sheet was completed, the data was keyed into a 
spreadsheet using the Excel software package. Finally, the data in the Excel 
spreadsheet is copied over to the SPSS software package for hypotheses testing 
employing the univariate Hest, a Chi-square test for the categorical variable, 
the Mann-Whitney U test, and the multivariate logistic regression test. 
4.5 The Measurement of the Variables 
The measurement for the dependent variable, disclosure, and the 
independent variables, finn size, industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, firm diversification, and ownership diffusion, used in the 
data collection and recorded in the data sheet based on the logistic model in the 
research design is discussed in detail below. 
4.6 Disclosure 
Disclosure, the dependent variable, is measured as a dichotomous 
variable. Disclosure is coded 1 for companies that voluntarily disclosed 
additional segment information over and above the required 3 items of segment 
data under the old Accounting Standard AASB 1005, namely: segment 
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revenue, segment results and segment assets, and coded O for companies that 
provided the required 3 items of segment data and companies that disclosed 
they operated in one industry and one geographical segment. 
In measuring the disclosure variable for voluntary and non-voluntary 
disclosure of se_gment data, both the industry segments and geographical 
segments we)·e analysed. A company is considered to be a "voluntary 
disclosure" fam if it disclosed additional segment data over and above the 
required: items in either its industry segments or geographical segments or in 
both its industry and geographical segments. This is because some companies 
only disclosed their industry segments as they operated predominantly in 
Australia (one geographical segment) and some companies only disclosed their 
geographical segments as they operated predominantly in one industry 
segment. 
A company is considered to be a "non-voluntary disclosure" firm if it 
disclosed the required 3 items of segment data in either its industry segments or 
geographical segments or in both its industry and geographical segments. A 
company is also considered to be a "non-voluntary disclosure" firm if it 
disclosed that it operated predominantly in one industry segment and one 
geographical segment (see pp. 9 - 13 for illustrations). 
4.7.1 Firm Size 
To test the firm size hypothesis, natural logarithm of total assets is used 
to proxy for firm size in this thesis. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) also used natural logarithm of total assets to 
proxy for the size variable. 
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McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) 
included natural logarithm of number of subsidiaries as an additional measure 
for size. This measure is directly related to both the political visibility and 
analysts demand for information explanations. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) argued that corporations with many 
subsidiaries are likely to have a greater analyst following and also more visible 
to shareholder interest groups, such as the Australian Shareholders Association 
and regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange and the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). Such corporations 
are likely to be perceived· as being more complex, making their activities and 
performance potentially more difficult for both analysts and special interest 
groups to understand and evaluate. Therefore, such corporations are more 
likely to disclose additional information. 
The number of subsidiaries or controlled entities of a firm is a measure 
of the business diversification of the firm. Corporations may control many 
entities incorporated overseas and therefore have diversified into different 
geographical segments through their foreign subsidiaries. Alternatively, 
corporations may have diversified into related or unrelated industries through 
the nature of the business activities of their subsidiaries. Therefore, the number 
of subsidiaries arguably reflects the business diversification of the finn rather 
than information demand by analysts and political visibility. 
4.7.2 Industry Membership 
Industry membership is measured as a dichotomous variable, coded I 
for companies in the mining and oil classification and coded O for the 
remaining companies. 
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The oil and gas industry in the USA has been identified as politically 
sensitive (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986) and has often been suggested as 
an industry of strategic importance (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). 
Similarly, the political sensitivity of the oil and mining industry in 
Australia has also been noted (Sidhu and Whittred, 1992). The strategic 
importance of the mining and oil industry in Australia could be attributable to 
its role as an important supplier of energy and raw materials to other industries, 
a major employer and a major export earner. It is also the subject of intense 
scrutiny by environmental lobby groups. 
The resources industry is arguably subjected to greater political scrutiny 
than other industries (Ball and Forster, 1982; Craswell and Taylor, 1992). 
Therefore it is argued that the resources industry is politically sensitive because 
of its strategic importance and will voluntarily disclose segment information to 
avoid political costs. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell et al. (1995) also 
measured industry membership as a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for mining 
and oil operations with the remaining companies coded 0. 
4.7.3 Minority Interest 
In this thesis, the minority interest variable is measured as natural 
logarithm of one minus the percentage of the subsidiaries of each sample 
company that are wholly owned. 
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The higher this percentage figure is, the higher the minority interest. In 
measuring this variable, the focus is on the number of subsidiaries that had 
minority interest shareholdings rather than on the magnitude of the minority 
shareholdings as a conflict of interest can arise between management and the 
minority shareholders in the subsidiary companies where there is minority 
interest shareholdings. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell et al. (1995) also used 
the conventional calculation of one minus the percentage of the number of the 
subsidiaries of each company which are 100% owned to measure minority 
interest. 
4.7.4 Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets 
(book value of debt over book value of total assets) in this thesis. This 
leverage specification is an objective measure9. 
Various measures for financial leverage have been employed by the 
authors of the previous voluntary disclosure of segment information studies. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) used the levernge specification of book 
value of debt plus contingent liabilities over total tangible assets to measure 
financial leverage. This is arguably a very conservative leverage specification. 
The inclusion of contingent liabilities in the numerator makes this leverage 
measure subjective, as noted by Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997). 
Bradbury (1992) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) employed the 
leverage specification of book value of debt over market value of total assets. 
This specification for financial. leverage reflects a going concern measure in 
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using the rparket value of total assets as the denominator. It should be noted 
that the market value of total assets fluctuatt!s with changes in the share price 
of the equity. However, as noted by Mitchell et al. (1995), there is no means of 
identifying the most appropriate measure to proxy for financial leverage. 
4.7.5 Firm Diversification 
The number of segments is used as the proxy for firm diversification. 
An analysis of the data sheet based on the research model revealed that the 185 
firms in the sample displayed segments ranging from a minimum of one 
segment to a maximum of nine segments. 
An additional specification, number of subsidiaries, was initially 
considered as an alternative proxy for highly diversified firms. The number of 
subsidiaries controlled by a firm is a measure of the business diversification of 
the firm. Subsidiaries may be incorporated in Australia or incorporated in a 
foreign country. Australian companies with foreign subsidiaries signify that 
they have diversified into other geographi..:11 segments. The subsidiaries may 
be operating in industries 1.hat are related or unrelated to that of their parent 
companies. Here, we see business diversification of the parent companies 
through their subsidiaries. 
The number of subsidiaries is a measure of the amount of subsidiaries 
controlled by the parent companies. It does not tell us (measure) the number of 
industry segments or geographical segments that the firm is operating in. 
Hence, the number of subsidiaries controlled by the firm is not a direct measure 
of how highly diversified the firm is. The number of segments is a more 
suitable proxy, so only the number of segments is used to proxy for firm 
diversification. 
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The number of segments is selected to proxy for firm diversification 
because the number of segments (industry or geographical) is a direct measure 
of the various different industry segments or geographical segments that the 
company has diversified into. The number of segments is an objective measure 
of how highly diversified the firm is as it measures the extent of the 
diversification of the firm using the number of industry or geographical 
segments disclosed in the companies annual reports under segment reporting in 
notes to the financial statements. The higher the number of segments disclosed 
in the segment information, the more diversified the firm is considered to be. 
An analysis of the segment infonnation disclosed in the companies' 
annual reports revealed that soP1e companies disclosed industry segments and 
geographical segments and some companies disclosed either industry segments 
or geographical segments. The companies that disclosed both industry 
segments and geographical segments have diversified into different industries 
and geographical regions. The companies that only disclosed industry 
segments have diversified into different industries but operated predominantly 
in Australia. Finally, the companies that only disclosed geographical segments 
have diversified into different countries and geographical regions but operated 
predominantly in one industry segment. 
For companies that disclosed industry segments and operated 
predominantly iu one geographical segment, that is, Australia, the number of 
segments will be the number of industry segments disclosed. For companies 
that disclosed geographical segments and operated predominantly in one 
industry segment, the number of segments will be the number of geographical 
segments disclosed. For companies that disclosed they operated in one 
industry and one geographical segment, the number of segments will be one 
segment. 
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For companies that disclosed both industry segments and geographical 
segments, if the number of industry segments is the same as the number of 
geographical segments, then the number of segments will be the number of 
industry segments or geographical segments. If the number of industry 
segments is not the same as the number of geographical segments, then the 
higher number (between the industry segments and the geographical segments) 
will be taken as the number of segments (see pp. 3 - 8 for illustrations). 
4.7.6 Ownership Diffusion 
Ownership diffusion is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares 
not held by the top twenty shareholders in this thesis. 
The higher the perc~ntage of ownership diffusion is, the more widely 
held are the company's shares. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Mitchell et al. (1995) also measured ownership diffusion by the percentage of 
ordinary shares held other than by the top twenty shareholders. 
4.SSummary 
The research methodology comprises the research design, the sample 
selection, the data collection, and the measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables. The research methodology is designed to test a total of 
six hypotheses in this thesis. The independent variables are firm size, industry 
membership, minority interest, financial leverage, firm diversification, and 
ownership diffusion. The dependent variable is voluntary disclosure of 
segment information. 
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The purpose of the research design is to describe how the six 
hypotheses will be tested. Descriptive statistics of the "voluntary disclosure" 
group and the "non-voluntary disclosure" group is designed to examine the 
statistics of the two groups of companies. The univariate Mest will be 
performed to provide robust results and a Chi-square test will be performed for 
the categorical variable. The Mann-Whitney U test will also be run and 
displayed for comparison purposes. 
Pearson correlation is designed to test the presence of multicollinearity 
between the continuous variables. The multivariate test is the logistic 
regression. The multivariate logistic regression is a more robust test than the 
univariate t-test. This is because, in the univariate test, the variable is tested in 
isolation from the other variables. Logistic r~ ~ssion examines the combined 
ability of all variables to explain the decision to voluntarily disclose. It 
provides an indication of the statistical significance of individual independent 
variables as well as for the overall model. 
The sample selection selects the target companies' annual reports from 
which the data for the hypotheses testing is obtained. The year 2000 annual 
reports were requested from the companies listed in 2001 Personal Investor 
Top 300 Shares. The first 200 annual reports received is taken as the initial 
sample of companies for data collection. Fifteen companies were excluded to 
arrive at a final sample size of 185 companies. 
A data sheet based on the research logistic model was designed for 
collecting and recording the required data to test ti;~ hypotheses. Each of the 
185 companies annual reports were analysed and the required data were 
extracted and recorded in the data sheet. The data were kt'yed into an Excel 
spreadsheet and copied over to the SPSS software packagl' for hypotheses 
testing. 
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Chapters 
Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first discuss the descriptive statistics relating to the 
independent variables. Next, the results of the univariate analysis of disclosure 
decisions are presented and discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the 
correlations among the independent variables. Lastly, the results of the 
multivariate logistic regression test are presented and discussed. 
5.2 Analysis of the Results 
The data sheet comprising the dependent variable of disclosure and the 
independent variables of natural logarithm of size, industry membership, 
natural logarithm of minority interest, financial leverage, firm diversification 
and ownership diffusion, was input into the statistical software package SPSS 
for data analysis. 
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are displayed in 
Table 1. ll was expected that the "voluntary disclosure" companies would 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics or lndeper,dent Variables 
Variable 
(expected 
relation) 
LnSize 
(1>0) 
LnMinority 
Interest 
(1>0) 
Leverage 
(1>0) 
Group 
0 
l 
0 
l 
0 
Diversification l 
(1>0) 
Ownership 
Diffusion 
(l>O) 
0 
0 
Mean 
20.24 
19.96 
1.65 
0.94 
50.44 
45.01 
3.86 
2.13 
35.28 
33.73 
Median 
20.30 
20.12 
1.95 
0.00 
53.!0 
48.60 
3.00 
1.00 
33.64 
33.31 
Min 
16.71 
16.17 
0.00 
0.00 
10.64 
1.41 
2 
1 
0.54 
0.49 
Max 
24.91 
22.86 
4.33 
3.84 
91.88 
94.19 
9 
7 
75.30 
91.30 
SD 
1.81 
1.60 
1.33 
1.24 
17.67 
20.29 
1.64 
1.56 
18.67 
18.94 
Note. Group I comprises companies which disclose additional segment 
information or voluntary disclosure companies, n = 65. 
Group O comprises companies that did not disclose additional segment 
information or non-voluntary disclosure companies, n = 120. 
Min= Minimum. Max.;:: Maximum. SD = Standard deviation. 
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have significantly greater mean and median values for the continuous variables 
than the "non-voluntary disclosure" companies. Table 1 shows the mean and 
median values for the natural logarithm of size, natural logarithm of minority 
interest, leverage, firm diversification and ownership diffusion are greater for 
Group 1 (voluntary disclosure companies) than Group O (non-voluntary 
disclosure companies). 
5.4.1 Univariate Tests Results 
Table 2 presents the results for the univariate analysis. The t-test 
results revealed that the firm size and ownership diffusion vari·1bles are not 
significant. The minority interest and firm diversification variables are 
significant at p < 0.001. The financial leverage variable is significant at 
p < 0.05. The Chi-square test performed for the categorical variable shows that 
the industry membership variable is not significant 11 . 
Natural logarithm transfonnation for firm size and minority interest 
were performed to counter positive skewnesfi in these variables. As natural 
logarithm for zero values is undefined, a constant was added P:"sulting in a 
minimum value of one for the minority interest variable. The minimum value 
of one for the minority interest variable yields a natural logarithm measure of 
zero. 
The Levene's Test for equality of variances indicate that all the 
continuous variables: natural logarithm of size, natural logarithm of minority 
interest, leverage, firm diversification and ownership diffusion, conform to a 
nonnal distribution. Pa: Jmetric, in preference to non-parametric, tests are thus 
employed to provide robust results. 
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Table 2 
Univariate Analysis of Voluntary Segment Disclosure Decisions 
Variable t-test M-Wz 
Size 1.098 -0.644 
(0.137) (0.260) 
Minority interest 3.615 -3.393 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 1.815 -1.629 
(0.036) (0.052) 
Diversification 7.065 -6.880 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership diffusion 0.535 -0.588 
(0.297) (0.278) 
Industry ml!mbership: Chi-square test xi= 1.127 (p = 0.144). 
Note. Voluntary disclosure companies, n = 65. 
Non-voluntary disclosure companies, n;;;: 120. 
Figures in parenthesis are one-tailed probabilities fort-test and Mann-Whitney 
Test. 
The Mann-Whitney Test that is based on ranks and is a non-parametric 
test was also run. The results is very similar to the t-test results with the 
minority interest and finn diversification variables significant at p < 0.001 and 
the leverage variable significant at p :::: 0.052. The size and ownership 
diffusion variables are not significant. 
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5.4.2 Comparison of the Univariate Test Results 
Table 3 presents a comparison of the uni variate test results of this the~is 
with previous studies. The most important univariate test results in this study 
was strong support being found for the firm diversification variable at 
p < 0.001 which differed from the findings of McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993), and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) where no support was found 12. 
Table 3 
Comparison of Univariate Analysis Results of this thesis with previous 
studies 
Variable McKinnon & Mitchell et al. This Thesis 
Dalimunthe ( 1993) (1995) 
Firm size p= 0.000 p =0.000 pa 0.137 
Industry membership p= 0.005 p a0.002 pa 0.144 
Minority interest p = 0.000 p a0.000 pa 0.000 
Leverage No support pa 0.018 pa 0.036 
Finn diversification No support No support pa 0.000 
Ownership diffusion p = 0.035 pa 0.001 pa 0.297 
The univariate results of this study also found strong support for the 
minority interest variable at p < 0.001, consistent with the results of McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). Support was found 
for the leverage variable at p < 0.05 which is consistent with the leverage 
results of Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) but differed from McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) 
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No support was found for the firm size, industry membership and 
ownership diffusion variables in the univariate results of this thesis. This 
differed from the findings of the above two previous studies where strong 
support was found for these three variables. 
5.4.3 Discussion of the Univariate Test Results 
This thesis employed the Contracting Theory (infonnation costs) to test 
the finn diversification and finn size hypothesis, Contracting Theory (political 
costs) to test the industry membership hypothesis and Agency Theory (agency 
costs) to test the minority interest, leverage, and ownership diffusion 
hypotheses. 
The firm diversification hypothesis was found to be significant at 
p < 0.001 and the firm size hypothesis was found to be insignificant. 
Information costs have been described as including the full range of collection, 
processing and dissemination costs, and also the cost of competitive 
disadvantage. Management have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment 
information provided the increase in firm value from disclosure will offset the 
decrease in firm value from proprietary costs. The univariate test results 
suggest that there is a net benefit for the management of companies with higher 
levels of diversification to voluntarily disclose additional segment information. 
No support was found for the firm size hypothesis suggesting that the size of 
the "vol•mtary disclosure" companies is not significantly different from that of 
the "non-voluntary disclosure" companies. 
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No support was found for the industry membership hypothesis. This 
suggests that political costs did not affect the mining and oil industry to the 
extent that voluntary disclosure of additional segment information would 
benefit the company. 
The minority interest and leverage hypotheses were found to be 
significant at p < 0.001 and p < 0.005 respectively. This suggests that 
voluntary disclosure of additional segment infonnation reduces the agency 
costs that increase with minority interest shareholders in the subsidiaries of the 
parent company. This also suggests that voluntary disclosure reduces the 
agency costs of debt. 
The ownership diffusion hypothesis was found to be insignificant 
suggesting that the ownership diffusion of the "voluntary disclosure" 
companies is not significantly different from that of the "non~voluntary 
disclosure" companies. 
' 
5.5 Correlation Matrix for the Continuous Variables 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations between the continuous 
explanatory variables. Some correlation between size and the minority interest, 
leverage and firm diversification variables exists and is in the range of 0.402 to 
0.461. The correlation between minority interest and finn diversification is 
0.529. The correlations among the independent variables are less than 0.5 with 
the exception of minority interest that is correlated to firm diversification at 
0.5291'_ 
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5.6.1 Multivariate Test Results 
Multivariate logistic regression is a more robust test than the univariate 
T-Test for voluntary disclosure of additional segment infonnation. This is 
because, in the univariate test, the variable is tested in isolation from the other 
variahles. Logistic regression examines the combined ability of all variables to 
explain the decision to voluntarily disclose. It provides an indication of the 
statistical significance of individual independent variables, as well as the 
overall model. 
Table 4 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Continuous Variables 
Variables 
LnMinority 
Leverage 
Diversification 
Ownership 
Diffusion 
Note. 
LnSize: 
LnMinority: 
Leverage: 
Diversification: 
LnSize LnMinority Leverage Diversification 
0.432* 
0.402* 0.267* 
0.461* 0.529* 0.246* 
0.027 0.013 0.022 0.020 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Finn size. Natura, logarithm of total assets 
Minority interest in subsidiary companies. Natural 
logarithm of one minus the percentage of the 
subsidiaries that are wholly owned 
Financial leverage. Total liabilities divided by total 
assets 
Finn diversification. Number of segments 
Ownership diffusion: Percentage of ordinary shares not held by the top twenty 
shareholders 
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Table 5 presents the multivariate logistic regression of the voluntary 
segment information disclosure choice of the 185 sumple finns. Model Chi-
Square is equal to 52.069 (degrees of freedom::: 6; p < 0.001) indicating that 
the overall model is a significant model. The signs of the coefficients for the 
variables that had significant explanatory power are in the predicted direction 
except for the coefficients of the firm size and industry membership variables. 
The firm diversification variable is significant at p < 0.001 and the finn 
size variable is significant at p < 0.005. The negative sign of the coefficient for 
the firm size variable indicates that larger firms are le.ss likely to voluntarily 
disclose additional information, or smaller firms arc more likely to voluntarily 
disclose additional segment data. The industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, and ownership diffusion variables are not significant. 
In this thesis, the multivariate logistic regression model tests all the six 
variables in a combined capacity to explain the voluntary disclosure decision. 
The firm diversification and finn size variables emerged as the significant 
variables in the logistic regression model of this thesis. This differed from the 
univariate test results where the firm diversification, minority interest, and 
financial leverage variables were significant. 
There is a direct relationship between the coefficients produced by logit 
and the odds ratio produced by logistic. A logit is defined as the log base e 
(log) of the odds. Logistic regression is in reality ordinary regression using the 
logit as the response variable. This means that the coefficients in logistic 
regression are in terms of the log odds. The odds ratio can be computed by 
raising e to the power of the logistic coefficient. 
i 
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Table 5 
Binary Logistic Regression of Voluntary Segment Disclosure Choice 
Variable 
(Expected sign) 
Coefficient Std. Exp(B) 
Error 
Constant 4.012 2.481 55.279 
(+/-) 
LnSize -0.378 0.142 0.685 
(+) 
Industry membership -0.853 0.552 0.426 
(+) 
LnMinority interest 0.132 0.159 1.141 
(+) 
Leverage 0.012 0.011 1.012 
(+) 
Finn diversification 0.753 0.141 2.124 
(+) 
Ownership diffusion 0.003 0.010 1.003 
(+) 
Model Chi-square 52.069 (d.f. = 6; p < 0.001) 
% Correctly Predicted 4' 73.5% 
Wald 
2.616 
7.141 
2.389 
0.686 
1.283 
28.500 
0.096 
!-tailed 
probability 
0.053 
0.004 b 
0.061 
0.203 
0.128 
0.000 a 
0.378 
Wald statistic is the square of the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error. 
Model Chi-square measures the significance of the model. 
Voluntary disclosers, n = 65. Non-voluntary disclosers, n = 120. 
a Significant at p < 0.001 
b Significant at p < 0.005 
¢1 Based on a 50% cut off. 
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The antilog of the coefficient [Exp(B)] is the 'odds ratio' produced by 
logistic regression. The odds ratio for the firm size coefficient is 0.685. This 
suggest that larger finns are 0.685 times more likely to voluntarily disclose 
additional segment information than smaller firms; that is, larger firms are less 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment information than smaller 
finns. 
The most significant variable in the logistic regression model of this 
thesis is the firm diversification variable with an odds ratio of 2.124. This 
suggests that firms with higher levels of diversification are 2.124 times more 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment information in a regulated 
setting than firms with lower levels of diversification. 
5.6.2 Discussion of the Multivariate Test Results 
The six hypotheses in this thesis were employed to test the contracting 
theory and agency theory. Specifically, the firm size and finn diversification 
hypotheses were used to test the contracting theory (information costs). '.1',•e 
industry membership hypothesis was used to test the contracting theory 
(political costs), and the minority interest, financial leverage and ownership 
diffusion hypotheses were used to test the agency theory (agency costs). 
The multivariate logistic regression test results found support for the 
contracting theory (information costs), but no support for the contracting 
theory (political costs) and agency theory (agency costs). This suggests that 
infonnation costs is the dominant factor for management's decision to 
voluntarily disclose additional segment information in a regulated setting. 
90 
According to contracting theory, infonnation costs include the full 
range of collection, processing and dissemination costs, and also the cost of 
competitive disadvantage. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Kelly (1994), 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996), and Piotroski (1999a) referred to information 
costs as proprietary costs. 
The multivariate test results suggest that management of firms with 
higher levels of diversification have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment 
infonnation. Managers are directly rewarded ..i:sing a variety of stock-based 
compensation plans, such as stock option grants and stock app!"eciation rights. 
Managers have incentives to engage in voluntary disclosure under these types 
of compensation plans to reduce the risk of undervaluation (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). 
Where there is a demand for private infonnation by financial analysts, 
investors, shareholders or debtholders, its non-disclosure is likely to be 
interpreted as bad news and hence adversely affect firm value as noted by 
Verrecchia (1983). 
The logistic regression results suggest that the increase in firm value 
from disclosure by firms with higher levels of diversification offset th-:; 
decrease in finn value from proprietary costs. Where there is a net benefit cir 
an increase in firm value from voluntary disclosure, managers have incentivet', 
to disclose additional segment infonnation over and above that required by 
AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments. This is because an increase in 
firm value may increase managers' bonus payments and the value of their share 
options. 
The multivariate test results found that smaller finns were more likely 
to voluntarily disclose additional segment information than larger firms. 
Following the same reasons for firms with higher levels of diversification, the 
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management of smaller firms have incentives for voluntary disclosure. The 
results suggest that voluntary disclosure by the managers of smaller firms will 
benefit both the managers and the firm, possibly by an increase in firm value. 
Larger firms are less likely to voluntarily disclose additional segment 
information than smaller firms due to proprietary costs of competitive 
disadvantage14. Kelly (1994) examined firms' decision to provide voluntary 
disclosure of segment information. He concluded that firms with high return 
on investment are less likely to voluntarily disclose disaggregated data than 
companies with low return on investment due to proprietary costs of 
competitive disadvantage. 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that proprietary costs induce firms 
to provide disaggregated data only when they have similarly performing 
business segments. Firms with widely varying performance across business 
segments have incentives to conceal these performance differences from 
competitors by only reporting aggregate performance. 
Piotroski (1999a) examines firms' decisions to provide additional 
segment disclosures. He concludes that firms with declining profitability and 
with less variability in profitability across industry segments are more likely to 
increase segment disclosures, consistent with the information costs of 
competitive disadvantage. 
5.6.3 Additional Binary Logistic Regression Test 
An additional binary logistic regression test was performed on the 
sample of 118 firms after removing the 67 single segment firms to confirm the 
results of the full sample of 185 firms. The results of this additional binary 
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logistic regression test on the 118 firms yielded similar results with the size 
coefficient negative and significant at p < 0.05 and the firm diversification 
variable also significant at p < 0.05. 
5.6.4 Comparison of the Multivariate Test Results between this thesis and 
previous studies 
Table 6 presents a comparison of the multivariate test results of this 
thesis with previous studies. The most important multivariate test results in 
this thesis was strong support being found for the firm diversification variable 
at p < 0.001 which differed from the findings of McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) where no support was found. 
Table 6 
Comparison of Multivariate Test Results of this thesis with previous 
studies 
Variable 
Firm size 
Industry membership 
Minority interest 
Leverage 
Firm diversification 
Ownership diffusion 
McKinnon & 
Dalimunthe (1993) 
p < 0.025 
p <0.025 
p <0.025 
No support 
No support 
p<0.05 
Note. *p < 0.005 is negative 
Mitchell et al. 
(1995) 
p = 0.01 
p = 0.05 
No support 
p = 0.01 
No supporl 
No support 
/ 
This Thesis 
p<0.005* 
No support 
No support 
No support 
p < 0.001 
No support 
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The multivariate test results of this thesis also found strong support for 
the size variable at p < 0.005 but with the expected sign of the coefficient 
opposite to the predicted direction. This suggests that larger firms are less 
likely to voluntarily disclose segment data than smaller firms. This finding 
differed significantly from the finding of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
and Mitchell et al. (1995) where larger firms are more likely to voluntarily 
disclose segment data than smaller firms. 
No support was found for the industry membership variable in this 
study which differed from the finding of the above two previous studies where 
support was found. 
No support was found for the leverage variable in this study, consistent 
with the results of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) but differed frum 
Mitchell et al. (1995). Finally, no support was found for the minority interest -
and ownership diffusion variables, consistent with the finding of Mitchel! et al. 
(1995) but differed from McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) where strong 
support was found. 
5.6.5 Discussion of the Multivariate Test Results of this thesis in 
comparison to previous studies 
The most important finding of this thesis was strong support being 
found for the firm diversification hypothesis. No support was found for the 
diversification into related versus unrelated induslries hypothesis by McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). The difference in 
this finding may be attributable to the difference in the measurement of the 
finn diversification variable. 
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McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) employed Chenhall's (1979) 
classification of related and unrelated markets and technologies to measure 
diversification into related and unrelated industries. It appr;:ars that the 
distinction between diversification into related and unrelated industries is based 
on the subjective criteria of "related market" and/or "technology". Mitchell et 
al. (1995) employed the STATEX classification of Diverse Industrials and 
Diverse Resources for identifying diversification into related and unrelated 
industries. The diversification into related versus unrelated industries in the 
two previous studies is a dichotomous variable. This thesis employed the 
number of segments to measure the level of firm diversification and this 
variable is a continuous variable. 
Strong support was found for the firm size variable of this thesis but 
with the ex.peeled sign of the coefficient opposite to the predicted direction. 
This suggests that larger companies are less likely to voluntarily disclose 
segment data than smaller companies. This finding differed from the finding 
of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell et al. (1995) where larger 
companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose segment data than smaller 
companies. 
The finding of strong support for the firm size variable but with the 
expected sign of the coefficient opposite to the predicted direction is 
~upported by the information costs (especially the costs of competitive 
disadvantage) of contracting theory .. The expected sign of the coefficient 
opposite to the predicted direction suggests that the smaller companies are 
more likely to voluntarily disclose segment information than the larger 
companies because the benefits from voluntary disclosure for the smaller 
companies out-weigh the proprietary costs of disclosure. 
The larger companies m the sample of this thesis arguably are 
companies with relatively high return on investment, being selected from the 
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Top 300 Shares, compared to the samples of the two previous studies 
comprising diversified firms listed on the ASX (see footnote !4). 
The multivariate test results for the firm size variable of this thesis is 
consistent with the information cost of competitive disadvantage (proprietary 
costs) of contracting theory, and the findings of Kelly (1994), Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996), and Piotroski (1999a). Kelly (1994) found that multi-
scgment firms with high return on investment are less likely to reveal 
disaggregated data than companies with low return on investment. Piotroski 
(1999a) examines firms' decisions to provide additional segment disclosures. 
He concludes that firms with declining profitability and with less variability in 
profitability across industry segments are more likely to increase segment 
disclosures. 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that proprietary costs induce firms 
to provide disaggregated data only when they have similarly performing 
business segments. Firms with widely varying performance across business 
segments have incentives to conceal these perfonnance differences from 
competitors by only reporting aggregate performance. 
No support was found for the financial leverage hypothesis in this 
thesis, consistent with McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) but differed from 
Mitchell et al. (1995) where strong support was found. A possible explanation 
for the difference in the financial leverage results is the different proxy 
meat,ures adopted for financial leverage in this thesis and the previous studies. 
The results for the mining and oil (resources) hypothesis in this thesis 
differed from the two previom; studies, namely: McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993) and Mitchell et al. (1995). No support was found for the industry 
membership variable in this thesis while strong support was found in these 
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previous studies. A possible explanation for this difference in results could be 
attributable to sampling difference between this thesis and the prior studies. 
Finally, no support was found for the minority interest and ownership 
diffusion hypotheses in this thesis, consi:::tent with the results in Mitchell et al. 
(1995) but differed from the results in McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993). A 
possible explanation for the difference in results could be attributable to 
differences in sample seh:ction. 
5.7 Summary 
Univariate and multivariate tests were performed on six hypothese!: in 
this thesis. The univariate Hest results provide evidence to support the firm 
diversification, minority interest and leverage hypotheses. The Chi-square test 
indicated no support for the industry membership hypothesis. 
The Mann-Whitney Test based on ranks and is a non-parametric test 
was also run. The results was very similar to the t-test results with support 
found for the finn diversification, minority interest and financial leverage 
hypotheses but no support for the firm size and ownership diffusion 
hypotheses. 
Multivariate logistic regression tests the combined ability of all 
variables to explain the decision to voluntarily disclose. It provides an 
indication of the statistical significance Qf individual independent variables as 
well as for the overall model. Model Ct.,i-square is equal to 52.069 (degrees of 
freedom = 6; p < 0.001) indicating that the overall model is a significant 
model. 
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The multivariate logistic regression test results found support for the 
firm diversification and fim1 size hypotheses. The minority interest, financial 
leverage, industry membership and ownership diffusion hypotheses are not 
significant. 
The antilog of the coefficient [Exp(B)] is the "odds ratio" produced by 
logistic regression. The odds rntio for the firm size coefficient is 0.685. This 
suggests that larger companies are less likely to volur.tarily disclose additional 
segment information than smaller companies. This finding is consistent with 
the information cost of competitive disadvantage of contracting theory, and 
also consistent with the research findings of Kelly (1994), Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996) and Piotroski (1999a). 
The most significant variable in the logistic regression model of this 
thesis is the firm diversification variable with an odds ratio of 2.124. This 
suggests that companies with higher levels of diversification are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose additional_ segment information than companies with a 
lower level of firm diversification in a regulated setting. 
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Chapter 6 
Condusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis focused on the firm characteristics motivating diversified 
companies in Australia to voluntarily disclose segment information in a 
regulated environment. The examination of economic incentives motivating 
voluntary disclosure of additional segment information is based on the 
hypotheses that this disclosure is expected to be greater for firms with 
particular firm characteristics such as finn size, industry membership, minority 
interest, financial leverage, firm diversification, and ownership diffusion. 
Theses firms, it is argued, have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment data 
over and above that required by AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments 
because of benefits such as reduced agency costs and political costs. 
6.2.1 Motivation for the Study 
This thesis is motivated by the opportunity to study the effects of a 
different sample of firms, a larger sample size, a different measure for finn 
diversification, and a regulated setting on voluntary disclosure of financial 
segment data. 
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This thesis re-examines the six hypotheses in the McKinnon and 
Dahmunthe (1993) study under a regulated setting to ascertain whether 
diversified companies have motivation to provide additional segment data over 
and above the mandated three items of segment revenue, segment results, and 
segment assets required by AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by Segments 
effective on or after 301h June 1986 but before the implementation of the 
revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting effective on or after 1st July 2001. 
This thesis examines the finn characteristics of firm size, industry membership, 
minority interest, financial leverage, finn diversification and ownership 
diffusion. 
6.2.2 Firm Diversification 
A new conception and measurement of the firm diversification variable 
is used which differed from that of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). The number of segments, which is a 
continuous variable, measures the firm diversification in this thesis. This is a 
better measurement as the level of firm diversification can be objectively 
assessed from the segment information provided in the company's annual 
reports. 
This variable is of particular significance in this thesis as finn 
diversification is likely to be an important attribute in management's decision 
to provide voluntary disclosure of additrnnal segment information in a 
regulated environment. This is because highly diversified firms are likely to 
have more significant infonnation content for investors. These firms are more 
likely to disclose private information for which there is a demand, provided 
there is a net benefit in the voluntary disclosure to the finns. 
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6.2.3 The Measurement for Voluntary Disclosure 
The measurement for voluntary disclosure in this thesis also differed 
from prior studies as this thesis is conducted under a regulated setting. A 
company that discloses more than the three mandated items of segment 
revenue, segment results, and segment assets in its industry segments and/or 
geographical segments is classified as a "voluntary disclosure" company. A 
company that did not disclose more than the three mandated items is classified 
as a "non-voluntary disclosure" company. 
6.3.1 Theory Development 
The theoretical framework explored and discussed the mechanism of 
employing compensation contracts and compensation ph:ms to align the 
interests of management with those of the firm, as well as developed and 
discussed the effects of information costs of competitive disadvantage and 
political costs on voluntary disclosure of segment disclosure. 
6.3.2 Agency Costs and Compensation Contracts 
The theoretical framework employed the agency cost of equity to 
explain the minority interest and ownersh!p diffusion hypotheses and the 
agency cost of debt to explain the financial leverage hypothesis. Contracts 
arise to minimise the costs associated with the conflicts of interest between 
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shareholders and management and between bondholders and 
shareholders/management. Voluntary disclosure of segment information can 
reduce the agency cost of equity and the agency cost of debt as segment 
information is considered useful information to shareholders and debtholders 
about the outcomes of decisions made by management. 
Compensation contracts are used to solve this agency problem. 
Managers are directly rewarded using a variety of stock-based compensation 
plans, such as stock option grants and stock appreciation rights. Manl'\gers 
have incentives to engage in voluntary disclosures under these types of 
compensation plans. Managers interested in trading their stock holdings have 
incentives to disclose private information to meet restrictions imposed by 
insider trading rules. Restrictions un insider trading provide managers with 
incentives to make voluntary disclosures to correct any perceived 
undervaluation prior to the expiration of stock option awards. 
6.3.3 Information Costs and Voluntary Disclosure 
It is assumed that there is information asymmetry between management 
and shareholders, debtholders and investors. Where there is a demand for 
private information by investors, its non-disclosure is likely to be interpreted as 
bad news and hence adversely affect firm value. Thus management have 
incentive to voluntarily disclose segment information to facilitate better 
assessment of the firm's performance. 
Information costs is used to explain the firm size and finn 
diversification hypotheses. Information costs includes the full range of 
collection, processing and dissemination costs and also the cost of competitive 
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disadvantage. There are two major forces in the infonnation costs influencing 
voluntary disclosure: (i) the cost of providing information and (ii) the 
corresponding associated benefits. Firms will voluntarily disclose segment 
information provided the increase in firm value from disclosure will offset the 
decrease in firm value from proprietary costs. This argument is reinforced 
where there is an increase in firm value as management may be rewarded with 
an increase in bonus payments and an increase in the value of their share 
options. 
6.3.4 Political Costs and Voluntary Disclosure 
Political costs, contracting theory, is used to explain the industry 
membership (resource classification) hypothesis. The resource.s industry is 
politically sensitive and this may be attributable to its strategic importance as a 
major employer, a major export earner and an important supplier of energy and 
raw materials to other industries. Certain industries may attract scrutiny from 
government agencies and special interest groups because of their strategic 
importance. These companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose segment 
information in order to reduce the political costs imposed by the government, 
its regulatory agencies and private interest groups. 
6.4 Hypotheses Formulation 
Six hypotheses are formulated for testing to facilitate comparison of the 
results of this thesis with McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia 
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and Loh (1995). The six hypotheses focus on a test of the contracting theory 
and agency theory. The finn size and firm diversification hypotheses are used 
as a test of the contracting theory, information costs. The industry membership 
hypothesis is employed to test the contracting theory, political costs. The 
minority interest, financial leverage, and ownership diffusfon hypotheses are 
used as a test of the agency theory. 
6.5.1 The Research Methodology 
The research methodology comprises the research design, the sample 
selection, the data sollection, and the measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables. The research methodology is designed to test a total of 
six hypotheses in this thesis. 
6.5.2 The Research Design 
The purpose of the research design is to describe how the six 
hypotheses will be tested. Descriptive statistics examines the statistics of the 
"voluntary disclosure" and "non-voluntary disclosure" groups of companies. 
The univariate t-test was perfonned to provide robust results and a Chi-square 
test was performed for the categorical variable. The Mann-Whitney U test was 
also run and displayed for comparison purposes. 
Pearson correlation was designed to test the presence of 
multicollinearity between the continuous variables. The multivariate test is the 
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logistic regression. The multivariate logistic regression is a more robust test 
than the univariate t-test. This is because, in the univariate test, the variable is 
tested in isolation from the other variables. Logistic regression examines the 
combined ability of all variables to explain the decision to voluntarily disclose. 
It provides an indication of the statistical significance of individual 
independent variables as well as for the overall model. 
6.5.3 The Sample Selection 
The sample selection selects the target companies' annual reports from 
which the data for the hypotheses testing is obtained. The year 2000 annual 
reports were requested from companies listed in 2001 Personal Investor Top 
300 Shares. The first 200 annual reports received is taken as the initial sample. 
Fifteen companies were excluded to arrive at a final sample size of 185 
companies. 
6.5.4 The Data Collectio.n 
A data sheet based on the research logistic model was designed for 
collecting and recording the required data for hypotheses testing. Each of the 
185 companies annual reports were analysed and the required data were 
extracted and recorded in the data sheet The data was keyed into an Excel 
spreadsheet and copied over to the SPSS software package for hypotheses 
testing. 
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6.6 The Hypotheses Tests 
The univariate tests performed to examine the hypotheses were the 
independent Hest, a Chi-square test for the categorical variable and the Mann-
Whitney U test. The multivariate logistic regression model was used to 
examine the combined ability of all variables to explain the decision to 
voluntarily disclose. The model provides an indication of the statistical 
significance of individual independent variables as well as for the overall 
model. 
6.7.1 Findings of the Study 
The following were the major findings of this thesis: 
(i) The most important univariate test results in this study was 
strong support being found for the firm diversification variable 
at p < 0.001. 
(ii) The univariate test results also found strong support for the minority 
interest variable at p < 0.001 and the financial leverage variable at p 
<0.05. 
(iii) No support was found for the firm size, industry membership, and 
ownership diffusion variables in the univariate test results of this 
thesis. 
(iv) The most important multivariate test results in this study was a 
positive association being found between firm diversification and 
voluntary disclosure of segment information and is statistically 
significant at p < 0.001. 
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(v) A negative association between firm size and voluntary segment 
disclosure was found in the multivariate test results and is 
statistically significant at p < 0.005. 
(vi) No support was found for the industry membership, minority 
interest, financial leverage, and ownership diffusion variables in the 
multivariate test results of this thesis. 
6.7.2 Discussion of the Univariate Test Findings 
This thesis employed the information costs, contracting theory, to test 
the firm diversification and finn size hypotheses. Information costs have been 
described as including the full range of collection, processing and 
dissemination costs, and also the cost of competitive disadvantage. 
Management have incentives to voluntarily disclose segment information 
provided the increase in firm value from disclosure will offset the decrease in 
finn value from proprietary costs. The univariate test findings suggest that 
there is a net benefit for the management of companies with higher levels of 
diversification to voluntarily disclose additional segment information. The 
findings also suggest that the size of the "voluntary disclosure" companies is 
not significantly different from that of the "non-voluntary disclosure" 
companies. 
Political costs, contracting theory, was used to test the industry 
membership hypothesis. The univariate test findings suggest that political 
costs did not affect the mining and oil (resources) industry to the extent that 
voluntary disclosure of additional segment information would benefit the 
company. 
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Agency theory was used to test the minority interest, financial leverage, 
and ownership diffusion hypotheses. The univariate test findings suggest that 
voluntary segment disclosure reduces the agency costs associated with 
minority interest shareholders in the subsidiaries of the parent company. The 
findings also suggest that voluntary disclosure reduces the agency costs of 
debt. Finally, the findings suggest that the ownership diffusion of the 
"voluntary disclosure" companies is not significantly different from that of the 
"non-voluntary disclosure" companies. 
6.7.3 Comparison of the Univariate Test Findings with Prior Studies 
Strong support was found for the finn diversification hypothesis at p < 
0.001 which differed from the findings of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) where no support was found. Strong 
support was also found for the minority interest hypothesis at p < 0.001, 
consistent with the results of McKinnon and Dalimunthe, and Mitchell, Chia 
and Loh. Support was found for the leverage hypothesis at p < 0.05 which is 
consistent with the leverage results of Mitchell, Chia and Loh but differed from 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe. 
No support was found for the firm size, industry membership and 
ownership diffusion hypotheses. This differed from the findings of the above 
two previous studies where strong support was found for these three 
hypotheses. 
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6.7.4 Discussion of the Multivariate Test Findings 
The multivariate test findings suggest that the management of finns 
with higher levels of diversification have incentives to voluntarily disclose 
segment infonnation. Managers are directly rewarded using a variety of stock-
based compensation plans, such as stock option grants and stock appreciation 
rights. Under these types of compensation plans, managers have incentives to 
engage in voluntary disclosure to reduce the risk of undervaluation (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Also where there is a demand for private infonnation by 
financial analysts, investors, shareholders or debtholders, its non-disclosure is 
likely to be interpreted as bad news and hence adversely affect firm value. 
The multivariate test findings suggest that the increase in firm value 
from disclosure by firms with higher levels of diversification offset the 
decrease in firm value from proprietary costs. Where there is a net benefit or 
an increase in firm value form voluntary disclosure, managers have incentives 
to disclose additional segment infonnation. This is because an increase in firm 
value may increase managers' bonus payments and the value of their share 
options. 
The multivariate test results found that smaller firms are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose additional segment infonnation than larger firms. This 
finding suggest that voluntary disclosure by the managers of smaller firms will 
benefit both the managers and the fi:111, possibly by and increase in firm value. 
The multivariate test findings found support for the infonnation costs, 
contracting theory, but no support for the political costs, contracting theory, 
and agency costs, agency theory. This suggests that infonnation costs is the 
dominant factor for management's decision to voluntarily disclose additional 
segment information in a regulated setting. 
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6.7 .5 Comparison of the Multivariate Test Findings with Prior Studies 
The most important multivariate test findings in this thesis was strong 
support being found for the finn diversification hypothesis at p < 0.001 which 
differed from the findings of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, 
Chia and Loh (1995) where no support was found. 
The multivariate test findings also found a negative correlation between 
firm size and voluntary disclose and is statistically significant at p < 0.005. 
This suggests that larger firms are less likely to voluntarily disclose segment 
data than smaller firms. This finding differed from the finding of McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995) where larger finns 
are more likely to voluntarily disclose segment data than smaller firms. 
No support was found for the industry membership hypothesis in this 
study which differed from the finding of the above two previous studies where 
support was found. No support was found for the leverage hypothesis in this 
study, consistent with the results of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) but 
differed from Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995). Finally, no support was found 
for the minority interest and ownership diffusion hypotheses, consistent with 
the finding of Mitchell, Chia and Loh but differed from McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe. 
6.8 Contributions of the Study 
The major contribution of this thesis is in the research findings of the 
multivariate logistic regression test that: 
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(i) There is a positive correlation between firm diversification and __ 
voluntary segment information disclosure and is statistically 
significant at p < 0.001. 
(ii) There is a negative correlation between firm size and voluntary 
disclosure and is statistically significant at p < 0.005. 
(iii) The correlation between industry membership, minority interest, 
financial leverage, ownership diffusion and voluntary disclosure is 
not statistically significant. 
The research findings contributed to our knowledge that the 
multivariate test findings of voluntary disclosure of segment dam in a regulated 
setting differed from that of an unregulated setting. The most significant 
contrast was in the size hypothesis where a statistically significant negative 
correlation was found in a regulated setting compared to a positive correlation 
in an unregulated setting. 
The research findings also contributed to our knowledge of the 
importance of information costs of competitive disadvantage on voluntary 
disclosure of segment data. The multivariate test findings contributed to our 
knowledge that information costs is the dominant factor affecting voluntary 
disclosure of segment information in a regulated setting. 
This thesis also contributed in the theory development of information 
costs of competitive disadvantage to explain the incentives behind 
management's decision to voluntarily di~close segment data in a regulated 
setting. This thesis also contributed in the development of the firm size and 
firm diversification hypotheses to highlight the role played by information 
costs on voluntary segment disclosure. 
This study contributed in the research methodology by devising a 
dichotomous measurement for the dependent variable disclosure in a regulated 
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setting. This thesis also contributed in the research design by developing a new 
concept of firm diversification and an objective measurement for the finn 
diversification variable. 
This research study contributed in the research methodology of sarn.ple 
selection. The sample firms were selected from the companies listed in the 
Australian Stock Exchange top 300 shares traded during January to December 
2001. The year 2000 annual reports of these sample firms were requested from 
the companies and the first 200 full annual reports received was taken as the 
initial sample of firms. The larger final sample size of 185 companies for 
hypotheses testing provides more confidence in the validity of the research 
findings. 
This research study and the research findings will benefit a wide variety 
of users of financial statements, especially, the shareholders, management, 
debtholders, investors, financial analysts, regulators and researchers. The 
empirical findings suggest that contracting costs, especially information costs, 
impact on companies with certain firm characteristics, namely: smaller in size 
and at a higher level of firm diversification, to voluntady disclose segment 
information. 
The research findings will have practical implications for the regulators. 
Accounting policy makers deliberating on mandatory disclosure issues may 
consider the existence of corporate incentives to disclose infonnation. 
Finally, this research study will be of interest to the researchers 
interested in voluntary disclosure studies as this is a voluntary disclosure of 
segment information study conducted in a regulated setting. Accounting 
researchers interested in conducting voluntary disclosure studies may consider 
conducting their studies in a regulated setting to further contribute to the 
knowledge in this area of research. 
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6.9 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
A limitation of this study relates to the sample ffr~s and in the 
' hypotheses testing. The sample of firms selected is frorri.i the top 300 
companies ranked by market capitalisation and listed in the Australian Stock 
Exchange. The selected sample is therefore not completely representative of 
all the companies listed in the Australian Stock Exchange as many smaller 
companies were not included in the hypotheses testing and data analysis. 
Another limitation of the study relates to the measurement of the 
independent variables. The measurements of the independent variables are by 
proxy measurements and may not be a completely accurate measurement of the 
independent variables. 
Further research can be expanded in two directions. First, firm 
diversification can further be investigated by using geographical segments as 
the proxy to measure firm diversification. It is possible that firms that have 
diversified into different geographical segments frequently describe overseas 
operations for which investors are likely to have difficulty gathering 
information. Alternatively, industry segments can be used as the proxy to 
measure firm diversification. 
Secondly, the role of firms with increasing profitability and widely 
varying performance across business segments on the information content of 
segment disclosure in a mandated environment offers interesting research 
possibilities. Research in this area investigates the impact of proprietary costs 
(informatioi1 cost of competitive disadvantage) on voluntary disclosure of 
segment data. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Early adoption of the revised Accounting Standard AASB 1005 
Segment Reporting was not undertaken as an initial survey revealed 
that no companies early adopted the accounting standard. 
2. The measurement for the firm diversification variable is not the 
number of industry segments plus the number of geographical 
segments because all single segment firms have one industry 
segment and one geographical segment, and this would yield 2 
segments for a single segment firm. 
3. The discussion of the measurement of the variables is to be found in 
the following page. 
4. The sample of 200 companies in this study were collected from 
compilllies listed in Top 300 Shares, 2001, February, p. 88; June, 
p. 100; August, p. 80; September, p. 72; October, p. 86; November, 
p. 80; December, p. 72. 
5. The year 2000 annuaJ reports (year ended from 1st January 2000 to 
31st December 2000) were collected from these companies. 
6. Only 200 companies from the top 300 companies were contacted to 
request for a copy of their year 2000 full annual report. The 200 
copies of annual reports received constitute the initial sample of 
companies. 
7. The final sample of 185 companies comprised of 65 voluntary 
disclosure companies and 120 non-voluntary disclosure companies. 
The 120 non-voluntary disclosure companies comprised of 53 
multi-segffient companies and 67 single-segment companies. 
8. Examples of additional segment data over and above the 3 required 
items are inter-segment sales, other revenue, abnonnal items, 
depreciation and amortisation, capital expenditure, segment 
liabilities and segment net assets. 
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9. This leverage specification is an objective measure as the figures for 
total liabilities and total assets can be directly extracted from the 
annual reports. 
10. The 65 voluntary disclosure companies are multi-segment finns. 
The 120 non-voluntary disclosure companies comprised of 53 
multi-segment firms and 67 single-segment finns. 
11. There are 30 mining and oil companies and 155 non-mining and oil 
companies in the sample of 185 companies. Of the 30 mining and 
oil companies, 8 are voluntary disclosure companies and 22 are 
non-voluntary disclosure companies. 
12. Strong support was found for the finn diversification variable in this 
study as the finn diversification variable, measured by the number 
of segments, can be objectively measured from the segment 
information presented in the annual reports after the introduction of 
the Accounting Standard AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by 
Segments. 
13. The correlations analysis was perfonned to test the presence of 
multicollinearity. In this study, the sample size is relatively large 
With 185 companies and multicollinearity will not be a problem in 
the multivariate logistic regression test. 
14. If the larger firms in the sample are more profitable than the smaller 
firms, and if firms that are more profitable have higher proprietary 
costs, then larger firms will be less likely to disclose voluntary 
segment data than smaller firms. 
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